Analysis: The Communities Near Gaza Have Taken the Place of the Yom Kippur Outposts
What lessons have we learned over the past 50 years? Unfortunately, not many
Photo: IDF spokesperson
There is nothing left to do other than echo the cry of the late Prime Minister Menachem Begin after the Yom Kippur War: "Where was the equipment?”
Where were the tools on October 7th, 2023? Where were the intelligence, surveillance, electronics, patrols, and all the rest?
The communities in the Gaza periphery, some of which were still under attack at the time of writing, resemble the outposts in the Yom Kippur War, 50 years ago today. Kibbutz Be'eri and Nahal Oz, with their residents playing the roles of the Budapest and Mesah outposts.
The communities, whose residents were hit by the first blows of Hamas terrorists who tore down the fence with a tractor and infiltrated the communities on foot, by car, and by drones.
With one key difference: the outposts in the Suez Canal, the Bar Lev Line, were located hundreds of kilometers away from Israel's borders. Now, Hamas militants have infiltrated communities, moshavim, and kibbutzim that are within the borders of the State of Israel.
This is not the ideal situation for conducting a deep enemy engagement in enemy territory; it's quite the opposite – the IDF is fighting against the enemy within the borders of the country.
The comparison to the Yom Kippur War is frustrating, to say the least: last week, it was reported that terrorists in the Gaza Strip were conducting military training exercises aimed at "taking over the Zionist enemy."
Even the Egyptian army, as estimated by Israeli Military Intelligence in 1973, conducted military exercises in the weeks leading up to crossing the Suez Canal in the Yom Kippur War.
So, have we learned anything since? Unfortunately, the answer is negative.
Where are the elite intelligence units and the intelligence officer who warned his superiors last week that this might not be an exercise or a drill, but rather that the terrorists were planning a major operation? What have the government, ministers, the Prime Minister, Knesset members, and politicians been busy with in the past few months? With the judicial system, the committee for appointing judges, the Reasonableness Clause.
It's not important right now who is right, but the result has been a deep divide in the public, with some saying it's a religious war and others claiming it's close to a civil war.
The enemy watching all these events from across the border concluded that the IDF had weakened, that deterrence had weakened, that they could strike, and that the IDF reserves were affected due to phenomena of non-volunteering and non-reporting for duty.
This is the wrong assessment because everyone unites at a time of crisis – but the result of this assessment is what is happening right now.
A Strategic Surprise
The IDF was strategically surprised. What happened to the policy of defending the communities around Gaza? The army taught us that an obstacle is worth nothing without fire cover.
So, where was the fire covering the fence that surrounded the Gaza perimeter? Instead, we witnessed a horrifying spectacle of a Hamas tractor seemingly working on a construction site, removing the fence as if it were just another task, and clearing the way for Hamas fighters to run inside the communities.
A resident of Be'eri hides in her home, her two young children clinging to her, and she whispers in fear on the phone: "I can hear terrorists on the other side of the door. My husband is at the community gate fighting with the terrorists. Where is the IDF? Please help me."
This is a distress call reminiscent of the dire circumstances of 1948, not of 2023, when behind Be'eri, a formidable army stands guard.
A formidable army standing guard?
Where are all the alerts, digital units, surveillance balloons, drones, and other military devices, that can see hundreds of kilometers ahead into enemy territory - but didn't see just a few meters, beyond the Gaza perimeter fence?
The army will probably eventually overcome the military turmoil it faces. However, the difficult and complex entanglement lies more in the fate of the captives held by Hamas.
I will not go into the details of such an event and its future at this time, but it would be wise to enlist anyone who has negotiated the release of captives in the past, and there are experts in such negotiations.
Recruit the Egyptian intelligence officers who assisted in mediation, all the German mediators, and others for the mission of returning the captives home, and quickly.
Countries that are part of the Abraham Accords can assist in such a humanitarian mission. There are women and children involved.
What lessons have we learned over the past 50 years? Unfortunately, not many
Photo: IDF spokesperson
There is nothing left to do other than echo the cry of the late Prime Minister Menachem Begin after the Yom Kippur War: "Where was the equipment?”
Where were the tools on October 7th, 2023? Where were the intelligence, surveillance, electronics, patrols, and all the rest?
The communities in the Gaza periphery, some of which were still under attack at the time of writing, resemble the outposts in the Yom Kippur War, 50 years ago today. Kibbutz Be'eri and Nahal Oz, with their residents playing the roles of the Budapest and Mesah outposts.
The communities, whose residents were hit by the first blows of Hamas terrorists who tore down the fence with a tractor and infiltrated the communities on foot, by car, and by drones.
With one key difference: the outposts in the Suez Canal, the Bar Lev Line, were located hundreds of kilometers away from Israel's borders. Now, Hamas militants have infiltrated communities, moshavim, and kibbutzim that are within the borders of the State of Israel.
This is not the ideal situation for conducting a deep enemy engagement in enemy territory; it's quite the opposite – the IDF is fighting against the enemy within the borders of the country.
The comparison to the Yom Kippur War is frustrating, to say the least: last week, it was reported that terrorists in the Gaza Strip were conducting military training exercises aimed at "taking over the Zionist enemy."
Even the Egyptian army, as estimated by Israeli Military Intelligence in 1973, conducted military exercises in the weeks leading up to crossing the Suez Canal in the Yom Kippur War.
So, have we learned anything since? Unfortunately, the answer is negative.
Where are the elite intelligence units and the intelligence officer who warned his superiors last week that this might not be an exercise or a drill, but rather that the terrorists were planning a major operation? What have the government, ministers, the Prime Minister, Knesset members, and politicians been busy with in the past few months? With the judicial system, the committee for appointing judges, the Reasonableness Clause.
It's not important right now who is right, but the result has been a deep divide in the public, with some saying it's a religious war and others claiming it's close to a civil war.
The enemy watching all these events from across the border concluded that the IDF had weakened, that deterrence had weakened, that they could strike, and that the IDF reserves were affected due to phenomena of non-volunteering and non-reporting for duty.
This is the wrong assessment because everyone unites at a time of crisis – but the result of this assessment is what is happening right now.
A Strategic Surprise
The IDF was strategically surprised. What happened to the policy of defending the communities around Gaza? The army taught us that an obstacle is worth nothing without fire cover.
So, where was the fire covering the fence that surrounded the Gaza perimeter? Instead, we witnessed a horrifying spectacle of a Hamas tractor seemingly working on a construction site, removing the fence as if it were just another task, and clearing the way for Hamas fighters to run inside the communities.
A resident of Be'eri hides in her home, her two young children clinging to her, and she whispers in fear on the phone: "I can hear terrorists on the other side of the door. My husband is at the community gate fighting with the terrorists. Where is the IDF? Please help me."
This is a distress call reminiscent of the dire circumstances of 1948, not of 2023, when behind Be'eri, a formidable army stands guard.
A formidable army standing guard?
Where are all the alerts, digital units, surveillance balloons, drones, and other military devices, that can see hundreds of kilometers ahead into enemy territory - but didn't see just a few meters, beyond the Gaza perimeter fence?
The army will probably eventually overcome the military turmoil it faces. However, the difficult and complex entanglement lies more in the fate of the captives held by Hamas.
I will not go into the details of such an event and its future at this time, but it would be wise to enlist anyone who has negotiated the release of captives in the past, and there are experts in such negotiations.
Recruit the Egyptian intelligence officers who assisted in mediation, all the German mediators, and others for the mission of returning the captives home, and quickly.
Countries that are part of the Abraham Accords can assist in such a humanitarian mission. There are women and children involved.
