Analysis | Blowing Up the Gaza Negotiations Could Lead to Another Escalation on the Northern Front
Will Hezbollah detonate the dispute in Lebanon and clash with the IDF? Will Israel launch a parallel attack in Rafah and Lebanon?
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 06/05/2024
Photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit
During the last eight months of the Iron Swords War, Hezbollah declared that Lebanon and Gaza are intertwined arenas. Escalation in Gaza will lead to a similar situation in Lebanon and vice versa; de-escalation in Gaza will lead to a similar situation in Lebanon.
While Hezbollah did not attack Israel on October 7 alongside Hamas, starting from that day, it started a war of attrition. Through anti-tank missiles, rockets, and other means, the terror organization managed to turn the northern region into desolation.
Aside from the military, hardly any residents remained near the Lebanon border. Tens of thousands of Israeli citizens became refugees in their own country for eight months. In this confrontation, Hezbollah holds the upper hand.
In a diplomatic effort to avoid further war, the IDF primarily invests in fortifying defensive lines and conducting surgical strikes, targeting Hezbollah operatives and destroying the organization's infrastructure in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line.
Israel demands the implementation of Resolution 1701, which implies Hezbollah's withdrawal to the Litani and the deployment of the Lebanese army from there to the border with Israel. Simultaneously, Lebanon argues that the implementation of this decision includes negotiations on a permanent agreement regarding the land border with Israel.
Between Lebanon and Israel, the United States and France have intervened, primarily through mediators, especially Amos Hochstein, the White House envoy, to reach an acceptable arrangement for both sides. The aim of the agreement is to end the fighting, even temporarily. As long as the political process with Hamas (the hostage deal) progressed, so did the agreement in Lebanon. It can be assumed, with Hezbollah's consent.
However, now that it seems the deadlock between Israel and Hamas is persisting and the head of the CIA is urgently dispatched to Qatar to try to resolve it, the question arises: what will happen in Lebanon?
Will Hezbollah blow up the negotiations and start an escalation against Israel? Will Israel launch a parallel attack in Rafah and Lebanon? Will the Israeli government manage to give the United States assurance regarding the Lebanese border in exchange for an American waiver for the entry of the IDF into Rafah? Will a hostage deal eventually materialize?
While the considerations are not yet clear, it seems that the Israeli government and security establishment do not take lightly the connection between Rafah and Lebanon. Adding to this is the publication by journalist Barak Ravid, claiming that the United States recently delayed a weapons shipment to Israel, indicating the gravity of the situation.
Israel depends on the US for a war in Lebanon. The existing stocks and the local production rate of various types of ammunition, for example, are not sufficient to support a high-intensity conflict in Lebanon for a period of one or three months. Another part of the offensive ammunition required by the IDF is not produced in Israel, and there is a dependency on American factories.
It is possible that the halt of weapons by the White House is intended to satisfy Israel's desire to conquer Rafah, in order to compel Jerusalem to sign a hostage deal. This, despite the fact that the White House understands that a deal perceived negatively by the Israeli public would jeopardize Netanyahu's power.
On the other hand, the turmoil in the US surrounding opposition to Israel jeopardizes Biden's second term in office.
There's no doubt that Netanyahu and Biden are in political opposition. The former prefers war over a bad deal, while the latter favors a bad deal over war.
These power struggles between Washington and Jerusalem are taking place while tensions in Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank are high, and any mistake by either side could lead to war on two fronts.
How far will the US go to pressure Israel? That's an open-ended question that needs an answer by the end of the coming weekend – at the latest. As time passes, the likelihood of a mistake increases, along with the likelihood of a war that no one intended to start.
Will Hezbollah detonate the dispute in Lebanon and clash with the IDF? Will Israel launch a parallel attack in Rafah and Lebanon?
Photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit
During the last eight months of the Iron Swords War, Hezbollah declared that Lebanon and Gaza are intertwined arenas. Escalation in Gaza will lead to a similar situation in Lebanon and vice versa; de-escalation in Gaza will lead to a similar situation in Lebanon.
While Hezbollah did not attack Israel on October 7 alongside Hamas, starting from that day, it started a war of attrition. Through anti-tank missiles, rockets, and other means, the terror organization managed to turn the northern region into desolation.
Aside from the military, hardly any residents remained near the Lebanon border. Tens of thousands of Israeli citizens became refugees in their own country for eight months. In this confrontation, Hezbollah holds the upper hand.
In a diplomatic effort to avoid further war, the IDF primarily invests in fortifying defensive lines and conducting surgical strikes, targeting Hezbollah operatives and destroying the organization's infrastructure in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line.
Israel demands the implementation of Resolution 1701, which implies Hezbollah's withdrawal to the Litani and the deployment of the Lebanese army from there to the border with Israel. Simultaneously, Lebanon argues that the implementation of this decision includes negotiations on a permanent agreement regarding the land border with Israel.
Between Lebanon and Israel, the United States and France have intervened, primarily through mediators, especially Amos Hochstein, the White House envoy, to reach an acceptable arrangement for both sides. The aim of the agreement is to end the fighting, even temporarily. As long as the political process with Hamas (the hostage deal) progressed, so did the agreement in Lebanon. It can be assumed, with Hezbollah's consent.
However, now that it seems the deadlock between Israel and Hamas is persisting and the head of the CIA is urgently dispatched to Qatar to try to resolve it, the question arises: what will happen in Lebanon?
Will Hezbollah blow up the negotiations and start an escalation against Israel? Will Israel launch a parallel attack in Rafah and Lebanon? Will the Israeli government manage to give the United States assurance regarding the Lebanese border in exchange for an American waiver for the entry of the IDF into Rafah? Will a hostage deal eventually materialize?
While the considerations are not yet clear, it seems that the Israeli government and security establishment do not take lightly the connection between Rafah and Lebanon. Adding to this is the publication by journalist Barak Ravid, claiming that the United States recently delayed a weapons shipment to Israel, indicating the gravity of the situation.
Israel depends on the US for a war in Lebanon. The existing stocks and the local production rate of various types of ammunition, for example, are not sufficient to support a high-intensity conflict in Lebanon for a period of one or three months. Another part of the offensive ammunition required by the IDF is not produced in Israel, and there is a dependency on American factories.
It is possible that the halt of weapons by the White House is intended to satisfy Israel's desire to conquer Rafah, in order to compel Jerusalem to sign a hostage deal. This, despite the fact that the White House understands that a deal perceived negatively by the Israeli public would jeopardize Netanyahu's power.
On the other hand, the turmoil in the US surrounding opposition to Israel jeopardizes Biden's second term in office.
There's no doubt that Netanyahu and Biden are in political opposition. The former prefers war over a bad deal, while the latter favors a bad deal over war.
These power struggles between Washington and Jerusalem are taking place while tensions in Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank are high, and any mistake by either side could lead to war on two fronts.
How far will the US go to pressure Israel? That's an open-ended question that needs an answer by the end of the coming weekend – at the latest. As time passes, the likelihood of a mistake increases, along with the likelihood of a war that no one intended to start.
