Analysis | Take a Look at the Houthis – and Learn About Hezbollah’s Capabilities
One can learn much from the Houthi rebel’s naval warfare and apply it to what the Israeli Navy is expected to face in a potential war in Lebanon against Hezbollah
Cmdr. (res.) Eyal Pinko
| 21/01/2024
The Israeli Navy might face similar challenges to those posed by the Houthis in the north. Photo: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait serves as a central transportation artery for global trade, with approximately 15% of trade between Asia and Europe passing through it. Bab el-Mandeb has been a focal point for crime and conflict in the past two decades, whether it involves pirates attacking merchant ships in the region or conflicts between the Houthis, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia since 2004.
Economic downturn
The straights, controlled by the Houthi rebels, are financially significant primarily for the European market and its supply chain. This is why the eyes of all the involved countries are on the region, and warships from the United States, Britain, France, India, and Italy have arrived there.
However, the European Union announced this week that its warships in the region are deployed solely to protect shipping routes and not to attack targets in Yemen.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both directly affected by the fighting in the region and having suffered significant losses in their prolonged wars against the Yemeni organization, have decided to conduct defensive operations to protect civilian shipping routes in the area. They have declared that their intention is not to engage in warfare again with the Houthi rebels. This decision is also driven by a desire to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and to maintain relatively calm relations, especially during the conflict in Gaza.
China recently declared that the activities of the Houthi rebels originate from the war in Gaza, without bothering to mention that its close and strategic partner, Iran, is the one supporting the rebel organization. China, of course, continues its maritime trade in the region without disruption.
Since October 7th, more than 42 military and civilian vessels have been attacked by the Houthi rebels, using various methods including remote missile attacks and unmanned aerial vehicles from both air and sea, as well as physical attacks and kidnappings.
The naval branch of the Houthi rebels, responsible for these attacks, operates from seven established bases prepared for them by Iran and the naval branch of Hezbollah. This comes after their operatives underwent extensive training in Iran in recent years.
The Houthis deploy a wide range of advanced weaponry against naval vessels, much of which is manufactured in Iran. This includes anti-ship missiles with ranges of up to 500 km, ballistic missiles with a range of 300 km, kamikaze drones, naval mines, and more.
The Houthis have been constructing a maritime picture for long-range targeting using a system of fixed and mobile coastal defense missile systems. They gather publicly available information on the movement of ships in the region and also receive assistance from Iranian naval combat and intelligence vessels operating in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea.
In early January, a number of attacks were carried out against Houthi bases by the naval forces of the United States and Britain, primarily in the TSNAA capital region. These attacks resulted in significant damage and the destruction of ammunition depots. However, they did not seem to have impacted the organization's motivation for fighting, and there was no cessation of its activities.
In the second week of January, an attack was carried out against the coastal surveillance system of the organization, and on January 20, 2024, the American Navy reported successfully intercepting three naval missile launchers.
The recent attacks essentially highlight the operational challenges that naval forces operating in the region face. The main challenge is the asymmetric warfare tactics employed by the Houthi rebels, which fundamentally resemble the doctrines of Iran and Hezbollah.
Main operational challenges
The lack of intelligence regarding the deployment of Houthi forces, especially away from their established bases, and the absence of intelligence indicating preparations for missile launches present significant challenges. Intelligence on such signs could aid in proactive measures and response strategies.
The threats posed by the Houthis are multidimensional and require sustained operational and technological capabilities to deal with various types of missiles (at different ranges, with different warheads, and on different flight paths), as well as unmanned aerial vehicles, both armed and unarmed. Additionally, there may be a need to contend with naval mines that could be deployed at the entrance to the straits.
The Houthis’ missile drone units are mobile and autonomous, operating from mobile platforms, primarily based on adapted Mercedes trucks. These units are equipped with 20-foot containers carrying the missile launchers.
Two vehicle operators can, within three to five minutes, remove the cover from the containers, raise a turret with a naval missile launcher, activate it, select a target within the weapon system (including receiving coordinates from an external source), orientate the launcher with one to three missiles toward the target, launch the missiles, and then disappear.
The missile launch can take place at a distance of several kilometers from the coastline, not necessarily near the shoreline. This operational mode makes it challenging to early detect and locate the dispersed units. It requires naval forces primarily to react to missile launches and then subsequently identify their source.
The variety and quantity of munitions employed by the Houthis necessitate constant vigilance and full readiness from naval vessels in the area. Sustained exposure to missile attacks may impact the resilience and effectiveness of naval crews over an extended period.
The continuous state of readiness at sea also requires significant techno-logistic preparedness on naval vessels. This ensures their sustained presence and autonomous capability to overcome equipment malfunctions while in combat.
The Israeli angle
One can learn a great deal from the naval warfare perception of the Houthi rebels at sea and apply it to what the navy is expected to face in a potential war in Lebanon against Hezbollah. Not only in terms of using various means of warfare, their diversity, multidimensional warfare, and the construction of the maritime picture with the assistance of static and mobile sensors – but also in the organization's intention to block maritime routes in the Mediterranean Sea and create a naval blockade on Israel.
Such a scenario would impact Israeli trade, supply chains, and the provision of food, water, and energy for Israel, all of which heavily rely on maritime transportation and the coastal region.
One can learn much from the Houthi rebel’s naval warfare and apply it to what the Israeli Navy is expected to face in a potential war in Lebanon against Hezbollah
The Israeli Navy might face similar challenges to those posed by the Houthis in the north. Photo: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait serves as a central transportation artery for global trade, with approximately 15% of trade between Asia and Europe passing through it. Bab el-Mandeb has been a focal point for crime and conflict in the past two decades, whether it involves pirates attacking merchant ships in the region or conflicts between the Houthis, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia since 2004.
Economic downturn
The straights, controlled by the Houthi rebels, are financially significant primarily for the European market and its supply chain. This is why the eyes of all the involved countries are on the region, and warships from the United States, Britain, France, India, and Italy have arrived there.
However, the European Union announced this week that its warships in the region are deployed solely to protect shipping routes and not to attack targets in Yemen.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both directly affected by the fighting in the region and having suffered significant losses in their prolonged wars against the Yemeni organization, have decided to conduct defensive operations to protect civilian shipping routes in the area. They have declared that their intention is not to engage in warfare again with the Houthi rebels. This decision is also driven by a desire to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and to maintain relatively calm relations, especially during the conflict in Gaza.
China recently declared that the activities of the Houthi rebels originate from the war in Gaza, without bothering to mention that its close and strategic partner, Iran, is the one supporting the rebel organization. China, of course, continues its maritime trade in the region without disruption.
Since October 7th, more than 42 military and civilian vessels have been attacked by the Houthi rebels, using various methods including remote missile attacks and unmanned aerial vehicles from both air and sea, as well as physical attacks and kidnappings.
The naval branch of the Houthi rebels, responsible for these attacks, operates from seven established bases prepared for them by Iran and the naval branch of Hezbollah. This comes after their operatives underwent extensive training in Iran in recent years.
The Houthis deploy a wide range of advanced weaponry against naval vessels, much of which is manufactured in Iran. This includes anti-ship missiles with ranges of up to 500 km, ballistic missiles with a range of 300 km, kamikaze drones, naval mines, and more.
The Houthis have been constructing a maritime picture for long-range targeting using a system of fixed and mobile coastal defense missile systems. They gather publicly available information on the movement of ships in the region and also receive assistance from Iranian naval combat and intelligence vessels operating in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea.
In early January, a number of attacks were carried out against Houthi bases by the naval forces of the United States and Britain, primarily in the TSNAA capital region. These attacks resulted in significant damage and the destruction of ammunition depots. However, they did not seem to have impacted the organization's motivation for fighting, and there was no cessation of its activities.
In the second week of January, an attack was carried out against the coastal surveillance system of the organization, and on January 20, 2024, the American Navy reported successfully intercepting three naval missile launchers.
The recent attacks essentially highlight the operational challenges that naval forces operating in the region face. The main challenge is the asymmetric warfare tactics employed by the Houthi rebels, which fundamentally resemble the doctrines of Iran and Hezbollah.
Main operational challenges
The lack of intelligence regarding the deployment of Houthi forces, especially away from their established bases, and the absence of intelligence indicating preparations for missile launches present significant challenges. Intelligence on such signs could aid in proactive measures and response strategies.
The threats posed by the Houthis are multidimensional and require sustained operational and technological capabilities to deal with various types of missiles (at different ranges, with different warheads, and on different flight paths), as well as unmanned aerial vehicles, both armed and unarmed. Additionally, there may be a need to contend with naval mines that could be deployed at the entrance to the straits.
The Houthis’ missile drone units are mobile and autonomous, operating from mobile platforms, primarily based on adapted Mercedes trucks. These units are equipped with 20-foot containers carrying the missile launchers.
Two vehicle operators can, within three to five minutes, remove the cover from the containers, raise a turret with a naval missile launcher, activate it, select a target within the weapon system (including receiving coordinates from an external source), orientate the launcher with one to three missiles toward the target, launch the missiles, and then disappear.
The missile launch can take place at a distance of several kilometers from the coastline, not necessarily near the shoreline. This operational mode makes it challenging to early detect and locate the dispersed units. It requires naval forces primarily to react to missile launches and then subsequently identify their source.
The variety and quantity of munitions employed by the Houthis necessitate constant vigilance and full readiness from naval vessels in the area. Sustained exposure to missile attacks may impact the resilience and effectiveness of naval crews over an extended period.
The continuous state of readiness at sea also requires significant techno-logistic preparedness on naval vessels. This ensures their sustained presence and autonomous capability to overcome equipment malfunctions while in combat.
The Israeli angle
One can learn a great deal from the naval warfare perception of the Houthi rebels at sea and apply it to what the navy is expected to face in a potential war in Lebanon against Hezbollah. Not only in terms of using various means of warfare, their diversity, multidimensional warfare, and the construction of the maritime picture with the assistance of static and mobile sensors – but also in the organization's intention to block maritime routes in the Mediterranean Sea and create a naval blockade on Israel.
Such a scenario would impact Israeli trade, supply chains, and the provision of food, water, and energy for Israel, all of which heavily rely on maritime transportation and the coastal region.
