Analysis | The Contact Line Will Always Be Breached
If military commanders consider the above sentence an axiom – then in strategic planning, they will provide a systematic, well-trained response for every possible breach within their sector
By Brigadier General (res.) Yaakov Zigdon
Any graduate of an IDF military college knows one thing, even if woken up in the dead of night: the line of contact will always be breached. This is the central working assumption in any defense array planning and operation.
These lines, written with immense pain during wartime, do not come from self-condemnation or to settle any score.
The commanders of the IDF, who are directly responsible for the disgrace that led up to the horrific events of Saturday, October 7th, are agonizing themselves as it is at the moment and will draw their personal conclusions in due time.
The author, Yaakov Zigdon. Photo: Hai Broide
These lines are written because they are still relevant for implementation in the settlement of the confrontation line in Northern Israel, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), and perhaps even beyond the Green Line.
The goal of the defense: The ultimate goal of defense is to “protect the strategic home front”. Or, in non-IDF terms: to defend the civilian population. In the specific case of that dark, fateful Saturday it is to defend the Israeli communities surrounding the Gaza Strip (known as the Gaza envelope communities) and the nearby cities such as Sderot, Netivot, and Ofakim.
A defense array has universal fundamental principles, and providing an effective response to them will build the most efficient defense.
Events and responses: If every commander knows that the contact line will be breached, then during the strategic planning, they will provide a systematic and well-trained response for every possible breach within their sector of responsibility. Naturally, they cannot allocate forces for every possibility; therefore, they will implement the principles of depth and reserve forces.
Depth and reserve forces: The construction of a defense array cannot be linear, based on the basic assumption that it will be breached. Every commander at every level will plan defense lines and position reserves that can intervene at a relevant time to overcome that breach. When creating depth is not possible, a strong defense will be built at the stop line.
The stop line: The line whose breaching will impact the strategic objective of defense, i.e., penetration into settlements in our current case. Since some places of the Gaza envelope areas do not have enough depth for defense – a robust and physical defense solution had to be planned there to separate the threat seen on the horizon from the settlements. In this case – the Israel-Gaza barrier, known as the “obstacle.”
The obstacle(s): The purpose of an obstacle is to divert the enemy to the locations I, the commander, prefer to engage with them and delay them so that I can identify their efforts and organize my response with the help of the reserve forces.
An obstacle, on its own, does not stand alone – and never can. It must include observation mechanisms, firepower, and forces that are deployed correctly. A shortage of artillery units in the Gaza envelope, for example, exacerbates the lack of understanding in establishing a defensive system.
Technology: This can support, strengthen, and streamline obstacles. It cannot be standalone. Excessive reliance on the remotely operated 'see-shoot' system has led to addiction and the atrophy of the defensive power. Every attack planner understands that there is a system facing them – in this case, a technological one. And like any system, it has vulnerabilities.
When the enemy located and neutralized these points, the result was the blinding of Israel’s presumed technological advantage. A pair of plain, dusty, scratched field binoculars would have yielded better results.
Military force: This is built from the capabilities of offense, defense, and civilian resilience. The Israel Defense Forces, contrary to its name, is primarily constructed and trained as an offensive military, stemming from a worldview and an understanding that, generally, defense does not decide wars.
The second reason is that the State of Israel cannot afford prolonged wars. Only the right balance between the three components of power will secure it. The moderation among these components is the art of military strategy.
Between defense and offense: The military planners, primarily the regional commands, divisions, and the command responsible for the defense array, are the ones who set the order of forces, deployment, readiness procedures, and so forth. The combat power, typically composed of rotating battalions, is the defending force.
Everyone who came into contact with the enemy on October 7th fought in isolated battles with a primary focus on initiative, improvising, and facing the enemy. These fighters, soldiers, and citizens deserve all the glory.
Alerting: A lot is still to be said about the absence of intelligence alerts. In the context of defending the force in contact with the enemy, this warning has no significance. It is the duty of all components of the defense array to maintain the highest level of readiness even in the absence of alerts. The successful deceptive actions of Hamas should not influence them. Again, from the same fundamental working principle that “the contact line will always be breached.”
Operational Routine: Everyone who is part of the defense array is required to maintain high levels of alertness, operational readiness, and combat preparedness. From the testimonies that have surfaced in the press, it seems that some of the forces were in a routine of holidays and weekends.
However, a force that comes in contact with the enemy, including the commands, must be at the same level of presence and preparedness throughout the week without compromise. The deviation of the IDF in recent years towards more comfortable service conditions needs to be re-examined.
Preparedness at dawn. Every soldier who has ever been on the frontlines is familiar with the daily sleep-depriving disturbance of preparedness at dawn. At that moment, everyone holding a weapon, binoculars, gun, or flight stick, must be in their position and ready for action.
On October 7, 2023, at 06:30 a.m., the sabbath would have been less bleak if a proper force deployment had been observing – and shooting.
Brigadier General (res.) Yaakov Zigdon served in the IDF Artillery Corps in various high-level positions. In his last role in the military, he served as the commander of the IDF’s Command and Staff College, and as the commander of the Fire Center of the Northern Force.
If military commanders consider the above sentence an axiom – then in strategic planning, they will provide a systematic, well-trained response for every possible breach within their sector
By Brigadier General (res.) Yaakov Zigdon
Any graduate of an IDF military college knows one thing, even if woken up in the dead of night: the line of contact will always be breached. This is the central working assumption in any defense array planning and operation.
These lines, written with immense pain during wartime, do not come from self-condemnation or to settle any score.
The commanders of the IDF, who are directly responsible for the disgrace that led up to the horrific events of Saturday, October 7th, are agonizing themselves as it is at the moment and will draw their personal conclusions in due time.
The author, Yaakov Zigdon. Photo: Hai Broide
These lines are written because they are still relevant for implementation in the settlement of the confrontation line in Northern Israel, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), and perhaps even beyond the Green Line.
The goal of the defense: The ultimate goal of defense is to “protect the strategic home front”. Or, in non-IDF terms: to defend the civilian population. In the specific case of that dark, fateful Saturday it is to defend the Israeli communities surrounding the Gaza Strip (known as the Gaza envelope communities) and the nearby cities such as Sderot, Netivot, and Ofakim.
A defense array has universal fundamental principles, and providing an effective response to them will build the most efficient defense.
Events and responses: If every commander knows that the contact line will be breached, then during the strategic planning, they will provide a systematic and well-trained response for every possible breach within their sector of responsibility. Naturally, they cannot allocate forces for every possibility; therefore, they will implement the principles of depth and reserve forces.
Depth and reserve forces: The construction of a defense array cannot be linear, based on the basic assumption that it will be breached. Every commander at every level will plan defense lines and position reserves that can intervene at a relevant time to overcome that breach. When creating depth is not possible, a strong defense will be built at the stop line.
The stop line: The line whose breaching will impact the strategic objective of defense, i.e., penetration into settlements in our current case. Since some places of the Gaza envelope areas do not have enough depth for defense – a robust and physical defense solution had to be planned there to separate the threat seen on the horizon from the settlements. In this case – the Israel-Gaza barrier, known as the “obstacle.”
The obstacle(s): The purpose of an obstacle is to divert the enemy to the locations I, the commander, prefer to engage with them and delay them so that I can identify their efforts and organize my response with the help of the reserve forces.
An obstacle, on its own, does not stand alone – and never can. It must include observation mechanisms, firepower, and forces that are deployed correctly. A shortage of artillery units in the Gaza envelope, for example, exacerbates the lack of understanding in establishing a defensive system.
Technology: This can support, strengthen, and streamline obstacles. It cannot be standalone. Excessive reliance on the remotely operated 'see-shoot' system has led to addiction and the atrophy of the defensive power. Every attack planner understands that there is a system facing them – in this case, a technological one. And like any system, it has vulnerabilities.
When the enemy located and neutralized these points, the result was the blinding of Israel’s presumed technological advantage. A pair of plain, dusty, scratched field binoculars would have yielded better results.
Military force: This is built from the capabilities of offense, defense, and civilian resilience. The Israel Defense Forces, contrary to its name, is primarily constructed and trained as an offensive military, stemming from a worldview and an understanding that, generally, defense does not decide wars.
The second reason is that the State of Israel cannot afford prolonged wars. Only the right balance between the three components of power will secure it. The moderation among these components is the art of military strategy.
Between defense and offense: The military planners, primarily the regional commands, divisions, and the command responsible for the defense array, are the ones who set the order of forces, deployment, readiness procedures, and so forth. The combat power, typically composed of rotating battalions, is the defending force.
Everyone who came into contact with the enemy on October 7th fought in isolated battles with a primary focus on initiative, improvising, and facing the enemy. These fighters, soldiers, and citizens deserve all the glory.
Alerting: A lot is still to be said about the absence of intelligence alerts. In the context of defending the force in contact with the enemy, this warning has no significance. It is the duty of all components of the defense array to maintain the highest level of readiness even in the absence of alerts. The successful deceptive actions of Hamas should not influence them. Again, from the same fundamental working principle that “the contact line will always be breached.”
Operational Routine: Everyone who is part of the defense array is required to maintain high levels of alertness, operational readiness, and combat preparedness. From the testimonies that have surfaced in the press, it seems that some of the forces were in a routine of holidays and weekends.
However, a force that comes in contact with the enemy, including the commands, must be at the same level of presence and preparedness throughout the week without compromise. The deviation of the IDF in recent years towards more comfortable service conditions needs to be re-examined.
Preparedness at dawn. Every soldier who has ever been on the frontlines is familiar with the daily sleep-depriving disturbance of preparedness at dawn. At that moment, everyone holding a weapon, binoculars, gun, or flight stick, must be in their position and ready for action.
On October 7, 2023, at 06:30 a.m., the sabbath would have been less bleak if a proper force deployment had been observing – and shooting.
Brigadier General (res.) Yaakov Zigdon served in the IDF Artillery Corps in various high-level positions. In his last role in the military, he served as the commander of the IDF’s Command and Staff College, and as the commander of the Fire Center of the Northern Force.
