Commentary | The Intelligence Assessment Has Failed
One can assume that the post-war investigation will show that there were telltale signs. The failure was in the assessment of the intelligence
Cmdr. (res.) Eyal Pinko
| 19/10/2023
More than 2,500 people likely participated in the Hamas attack on the 7th of October, who crossed the fence from the land, from the air, and attempts from the sea as well.
The campaign launched by the murderous and abominable organization was not planned in a single moment; it was planned over time, based on intelligence, with operational planning, timing, accumulation of weapons, and repeated training of the fighting forces.
Cumulative evidence, photos, videos, and media reports allow us to try and evaluate what happened that Saturday and analyze the reasons for the failures.
The first signs of the attack could have been seen in an unusual meeting held last April in Beirut with the participation of the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and representatives of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad.
The purpose and contents of this meeting are unknown, but in hindsight, was likely a meeting to coordinate the next moves.
More evidence of the preparations for the murderous and inhumane attack is the intelligence materials found on the bodies of the terrorists, which included aerial photographs of the Israeli communities, access roads, etc.
Materials were also found with a description and number of military units in the Gaza Strip area, their patrol schedule, a description of the central military, an analysis of the vulnerable spots of Israeli tanks, and more.
This evidence points to the systematic collection of information from many sources, including field tours in the communities, information from the Internet, and professional technical analysis.
Why was there no alert?
It should not come as a surprise that such intelligence was obtained. People from the Gaza Strip with work permits (about 18,500 permits were issued annually), along with illegal residents, and even Israeli Arabs – roamed Israel freely, and were able to collect all of the information uninterrupted.
The main questions now arising are why no intelligence warning was received and how the IDF did not react to hundreds of terrorists crossing the border and raiding Israeli communities. How did the best technologies in the world fail to identify the activity of Hamas operatives, before they even approached the border fence? How did Hamas drones disable all warning and observation systems using simple and cheap weapons?
An unhindered invasion
When analyzing the various video clips, the soldiers’ conversations, and the photos from the IDF posts, it is understood that the attack was carried out in the dark before dawn (before 06:35 on Saturday morning, the time the sun rose).
At that time, there were no indications of infiltration attempts through the fence. The barrage of rockets on the surrounding communities and the more distant Israeli cities began at 6:30 a.m. It appears that fifteen minutes later, hundreds of Hamas operatives breached the border fence in dozens of different places, joined by an air invasion using motorized parachutes – uninterrupted.
These were attacks in which a few hundred terrorists participated. They managed to take control of the outposts and murder their soldiers, including the operators of the observation systems along the border.
Incorrect assessment
The intelligence collected by the Israeli defense array is analyzed by research officers, and its assessment is distributed to the operational, military, and political levels. The assessment includes an analysis of the information and its implications, such as whether Hamas is organizing or operating in an unconventional manner. It is possible that the researchers in the Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet assessed the collected information incorrectly.
The intelligence assessment then goes to the head of the Research Division for approval, from there to the head of the Intelligence Directorate and to the Chief of Staff. It is possible that senior officials received assessments indicating abnormalities, but did not agree with them. In a press interview about a week before the war broke out, the Chief of Staff declared that Hamas was deterred and had no intention of launching a military campaign.
Looking at the near past, when Hamas refrained from intervening in Operation Shield and Arrow, which Israel against the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in May of this year, Israel interpreted it as if it (Hamas) were deterred.
With the wisdom of hindsight, this could be analyzed as a situation where, by not interfering, Hamas was helping to eliminate its rival organization, all while stockpiling weapons, gathering forces, and organizing itself for its big October operation.
Recently, riots have started along the Gaza border and in West Bank cities. The Shin Bet and the IDF feared a flare-up in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and sent many forces there, including units initially assigned to the Gaza Division.
Hamas sent messages that it wanted calm; consequently, Israel allowed Qatar to transfer aid money. The potential normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia was another motivating factor for approving the funds transfer. Israel wanted to promote the agreement and thought the flow of funds to the Strip would allow for an "industrial peace."
It is likely that the intelligence array assessed that the money, together with calming messages directed at Hamas, would lead to quiet. This, despite the fact that only three weeks before the war, Hamas held a large-scale exercise in which all phases of the war were practiced.
One can assume that the post-war investigation will show that there were telltale signs. The failure was in the assessment of the intelligence
More than 2,500 people likely participated in the Hamas attack on the 7th of October, who crossed the fence from the land, from the air, and attempts from the sea as well.
The campaign launched by the murderous and abominable organization was not planned in a single moment; it was planned over time, based on intelligence, with operational planning, timing, accumulation of weapons, and repeated training of the fighting forces.
Cumulative evidence, photos, videos, and media reports allow us to try and evaluate what happened that Saturday and analyze the reasons for the failures.
The first signs of the attack could have been seen in an unusual meeting held last April in Beirut with the participation of the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and representatives of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad.
The purpose and contents of this meeting are unknown, but in hindsight, was likely a meeting to coordinate the next moves.
More evidence of the preparations for the murderous and inhumane attack is the intelligence materials found on the bodies of the terrorists, which included aerial photographs of the Israeli communities, access roads, etc.
Materials were also found with a description and number of military units in the Gaza Strip area, their patrol schedule, a description of the central military, an analysis of the vulnerable spots of Israeli tanks, and more.
This evidence points to the systematic collection of information from many sources, including field tours in the communities, information from the Internet, and professional technical analysis.
Why was there no alert?
It should not come as a surprise that such intelligence was obtained. People from the Gaza Strip with work permits (about 18,500 permits were issued annually), along with illegal residents, and even Israeli Arabs – roamed Israel freely, and were able to collect all of the information uninterrupted.
The main questions now arising are why no intelligence warning was received and how the IDF did not react to hundreds of terrorists crossing the border and raiding Israeli communities. How did the best technologies in the world fail to identify the activity of Hamas operatives, before they even approached the border fence? How did Hamas drones disable all warning and observation systems using simple and cheap weapons?
An unhindered invasion
When analyzing the various video clips, the soldiers’ conversations, and the photos from the IDF posts, it is understood that the attack was carried out in the dark before dawn (before 06:35 on Saturday morning, the time the sun rose).
At that time, there were no indications of infiltration attempts through the fence. The barrage of rockets on the surrounding communities and the more distant Israeli cities began at 6:30 a.m. It appears that fifteen minutes later, hundreds of Hamas operatives breached the border fence in dozens of different places, joined by an air invasion using motorized parachutes – uninterrupted.
These were attacks in which a few hundred terrorists participated. They managed to take control of the outposts and murder their soldiers, including the operators of the observation systems along the border.
Incorrect assessment
The intelligence collected by the Israeli defense array is analyzed by research officers, and its assessment is distributed to the operational, military, and political levels. The assessment includes an analysis of the information and its implications, such as whether Hamas is organizing or operating in an unconventional manner. It is possible that the researchers in the Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet assessed the collected information incorrectly.
The intelligence assessment then goes to the head of the Research Division for approval, from there to the head of the Intelligence Directorate and to the Chief of Staff. It is possible that senior officials received assessments indicating abnormalities, but did not agree with them. In a press interview about a week before the war broke out, the Chief of Staff declared that Hamas was deterred and had no intention of launching a military campaign.
Looking at the near past, when Hamas refrained from intervening in Operation Shield and Arrow, which Israel against the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in May of this year, Israel interpreted it as if it (Hamas) were deterred.
With the wisdom of hindsight, this could be analyzed as a situation where, by not interfering, Hamas was helping to eliminate its rival organization, all while stockpiling weapons, gathering forces, and organizing itself for its big October operation.
Recently, riots have started along the Gaza border and in West Bank cities. The Shin Bet and the IDF feared a flare-up in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and sent many forces there, including units initially assigned to the Gaza Division.
Hamas sent messages that it wanted calm; consequently, Israel allowed Qatar to transfer aid money. The potential normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia was another motivating factor for approving the funds transfer. Israel wanted to promote the agreement and thought the flow of funds to the Strip would allow for an "industrial peace."
It is likely that the intelligence array assessed that the money, together with calming messages directed at Hamas, would lead to quiet. This, despite the fact that only three weeks before the war, Hamas held a large-scale exercise in which all phases of the war were practiced.
