“The Ground Forces Can Utilize All of the Capabilities of IAF”
“What we saw during Operation Protective Edge was maximum utilization of air-land cooperation,” says the commander of the IAF air-ground cooperation unit in an exclusive interview about the future of combined-arms operations
Or Heller
| 02/06/2015
"Additional machine guns on our shoulders,” was how Hertzi HaLevi, commander of the IDF Paratrooper Brigade during Operation Cast Lead (who now serves as Head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate), described the close air support he received from the Cobra attack helicopters of IAF Squadron 160 during that operation.
“A friendly foreign army,” is the humorous way in which the men of the IDF ground forces refer to the IAF: a separate, neater and better organized military force that comes in, bombs the enemy and departs, leaving it to the “Green Uniforms” on the ground to handle the dust and the mess.
The job of Colonel Oren is located half-way between those two statements. Oren, 43, married with three daughters and residing at a community settlement in central Israel, is the commander of the IAF air-ground cooperation unit.
He enlisted in 1990 and joined the IAF. “I found myself flying in the IAF. I had not built flying models as a child and it was not my childhood dream,” says Oren in an interview to Israel
Defense.
He started out as a Cobra attack helicopter pilot and advanced to the position of commander of IAF Squadron 113, the “Hornet” Apache Longbow attack helicopter squadron, deployed at Ramon IAF airbase in the Negev. As an attack helicopter pilot and commander, he took part in a countless number of operations in Lebanon and in other sectors.
During Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, he served as an Apache attack helicopter pilot. IAF Commandant Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel decided, during the operation, on August 23, after the ground operation against the Hamas tunnels had ended, that Oren should be appointed as commander of the IAF air-ground cooperation unit. “In the IAF the mechanisms are sufficiently solid to enable the replacement of commanders even during an on-going operation. This decision proved itself – it is not a case of people who had parachuted into the IAF from outer space.”
How do you conclude the air-ground cooperation during Operation Protective Edge?
“What we saw during Operation Protective Edge was maximum utilization of air-ground cooperation in the context of a highly specific and focused mission, as far as the ground maneuvering aspect was concerned. If the required achievement was hitting the shaft of a tunnel, we knew how to accomplish that. It was an impressive air-ground cooperation effort. The IAF was committed to the participation mission in the view of the ground forces people as well as in the view of the IAF people. It was effective and powerful over a long period of time. Some of the strikes were carried out very close to the ground forces and within short time constants. It was highly effective. Each bomb that we dropped landed where we had intended it to land and where the ground force had intended it to land.
“The distances between our own forces and the targets we engaged, the amounts of ordnance we dropped there and mainly the timeframes were things we had not done before. When a brigade commander wanted a bomb dropped, it was delivered very quickly. The average (response time) was less than one hour, about 45 minutes.”
In a theater of operations like the Gaza Strip, where the life cycle of a target can be a matter of seconds, is it not too long?
“It was not a full hour. The average was 45 minutes. We are going toward very short time intervals. It depends on the maturity of automated systems and it depends on the maturity of personnel training. The process is ready. It depends on the installation of a (software) version at some of the divisions. We practiced it in the context of the divisional training exercise of the IDF 319th Division and the training exercise of the IDF Galilee Formation, the 91st Division. The targets were transmitted by the battalion commander, who had decided that a certain target was threatening him, directly to the aircraft and the mission was executed very quickly.
“This process is made up of the competence of people, the maturity of automated systems and a (common) language. The ‘Green’ system speaks with the ‘Blue’ system. In the battle procedure, there are urgent targets and there are future targets. With the urgent targets we were fairly quick. We are going toward a ten-minute interval with urgent targets. When a brigade commander requests an urgent bombing, he will receive it within ten minutes. This stems from the technological maturity of systems that communicate with one another, the Masu’ah system (the command and control system of the tactical ground forces – O.H.) and the Command and Control system of the IAF. Today, when you press a button of the Masu’ah system to designate a target, this target is uploaded directly to the aircraft. You do not need people in the middle to establish an interface or to provide a map reference. You do need people to supervise the process, however, so that the bomb does not land on our own forces – and people to perform quality assurance, so that the bomb drops on the right house without damaging uninvolved parties.”
Is there apprehension of “friendly fire”situations owing to these prompt fire cycle closures?
“During Operation Protective Edge there were no air-ground ‘friendly fire’ situations as a result of a bomb dropping where we had not intended it to drop. It did not happen because there were people supervising these processes. When you clear your mistakes along the way, you cannot end up in such situations. The amount of ordnance we dropped there was immense. The high success rates were even more dramatic owing to the total absence of errors while at the ‘plant’ itself, I was in charge of the strike process.”
When a ground maneuver begins and the IAF comes in to support the maneuver, what is the actual practice of coordination?
“We are talking about missions involving threats to the forces during the maneuver. When a force maneuvers, they know they have a very powerful air force over them. The attack helicopter layout communicates directly with the battalion commanders on the ground. The support provided by the strike fighter layout is indirect. The battalion commander submits a target through the brigade HQ, the divisional HQ and the forward command post. Today we have reached a situation where the indirect support is, in fact, a shorter process, as the battalion commander designates the target using the Masu’ah system, and the target is assigned to the aircraft within a very short time. We do not currently have a system that knows how to tell the helicopter pilot where to attack, and the launching of munitions from a helicopter necessitates direct communication between the battalion commander and the pilot. It is a different category of targets. The attack helicopter pilot receives the target from the battalion commander. It is the battalion commander’s responsibility to ‘incriminate’ the target and the pilot re-checks that it is logical, that it is not a ‘hands-off’ target, that it is not a hospital or a school and then he will execute. Fighter pilots receive the target data with all of the intelligence evaluations regarding the target.
“There were many incidents during Operation Protective Edge where the control processes took longer. It is a logical dialog. The mission is a joint mission. When a battalion commander requests that a target be attacked it is because that target threatens his forces. If we encounter a problem there, a dialog will begin. The process of assigning a target to a fighter aircraft takes place under fluorescent lights. The controller at the command center is not under any battlefield pressures. He is a professional. He plans the target. He is not looking at the picture through the sights of an M-16 rifle that is currently under threat. It is not a matter of refusing an order but a joint mission and a common target.
“When a bomb explodes close to a ground force, it enables those troopers to raise their heads. During Operation Protective Edge we operated within very close ranges. The effect of the bomb takes place because the bombs we use are very accurate and our control processes are effective. Wherever we provided support within close distances in the context of missions where our forces were under fire, the strikes by the IAF were effective. When a 1-ton bomb drops very close to our own forces, it does a lot on the ground – to the confidence of our own forces as well as to the enemy.”
The IAF participation department is currently working on the fire plans of the IDF regional commands, including the operative plans for the next war. Colonel Oren states proudly that according to the work plan for 2015, the air-ground cooperation unit has a training exercise every week – like the recent training exercise of the IDF Kfir Infantry Brigade and the brigade-level exercise of the IDF Paratroopers Brigade, which ended just a short while prior to the interview.
“My message is a simple one: my unit is present at all of the IDF units in the form of air support representatives, including all of the strike cells of the regional commands. We are an operational unit. In the brigade exercises, I implement the lessons from Operation Protective Edge: effectiveness, quality and time. This is the entire equation. I train my people to be even more competent. Being an airman on the ground is a specialized profession. My people plan target strikes in real time. The personnel of the air-ground cooperation unit consists mainly of reservists. I have to look them in the eye and vouch for their competence – that they are capable of carrying out this mission, and we train them for this purpose. We realized that the automated systems are our primary weapon, and we are currently developing simulators for individual practice of the fire procedures, so that our air support officers will be able to assign a target as quickly as possible, within a few minutes.”
How do you envision the future of the IAF air-ground cooperation unit?
“The future is stronger, faster and more extensively automated. Everything combined means more effective. When I leave this unit eventually, I want my people to be the world champions in their capacity as planners using an automated system. I want each and every person involved in the process to know how to take a request (for support) and convert it into a target as fast and as uniquely as he or she can.
“The reservists are dependent upon the training exercises. We summon them quite frequently. The professional skill is understanding which bomb fitted with which fuse may be dropped within what timeframe where we intended. Pin-pointing the map reference for a precision strike takes time. As an air support officer attached to the divisional HQ you should be able to determine when the target should evolve from a Masu’ah target to an IAF target. Who authorizes it? What should be done before the status changes?”
In the context of the attempt to teach the ground forces what air-launched fire actually means, a training center was established at the air-ground cooperation unit. Lt. Col. Uri, formerly of the Golani Infantry Brigade, is the commander of the training center. They call it “the reform of shortening the response intervals from the moment the request is submitted to the moment when the target is actually attacked.”
“My job is to teach ground operations to IAF personnel and air operations to ground forces personnel,” says Colonel Oren. “We teach people a new language. Everyone speaks Hebrew, but the focus of each force is different. If you fail to teach the pilot at the IAF operational training course about the challenges facing the ground forces, he will never know what they are, and if you fail to teach the officers attending the IDF battalion commander course what the IAF does – you will lose. When I attended the IAF operational training course this had not existed, but today every young combat officer in the IAF is introduced to all of the various layouts: transport, aerial reconnaissance, UAVs, fighter aircraft and attack helicopters. 2,000 commanders attend these training courses each year.”
When you studied ground operations, was there anything that surprised you?
“The challenges facing ground forces commanders are different. A division commander commands thousands of people. He issues a directive that indicates a direction, while I, as an IAF pilot, command my mission end-to-end. The division commander looks at it differently. It is an unfair question as I learned that any subject in which I am not proficient will be difficult for me. It is very difficult to be on the ground. It is complex. Executing a ground maneuver by a division or a brigade is a very, very complex undertaking. It is complex even if no one is firing at you, and it is even more complex when the enemy is firing at you.”
What will the air-ground cooperation look like in the next war?
“According to the directive of the IAF Commandant, the participation mission is regarded as one of the IAF’s primary missions. We need to be more effective. We need to understand the required achievement of the ground forces and make sure that the IAF contributes to the accomplishment of that mission. I think we have excellent tools even today and the air-ground trust has reached an unprecedented level. Trust is not gained through words but through deeds. When you know that someone has submitted a request, it should be fulfilled and if it is not fulfilled, there must be a good reason for it. Trust is the sentimental expression of working together. I am a personal friend of the division commanders and have attended the last division commander course. Trust is established between people. The commander of the IDF 319th Division, the Mapatz Formation, Brig. Gen. Yaakov Benjo, is a personal friend of mine. We speak once a week and I am committed to him. When I met the commander of the IDF 98th Division, Brig. Gen. Amir Baram, I realized that he is one of my clients and I will do anything to help him succeed.”
Does the IAF air-ground cooperation unit take part in the planning of the operative plans of the IDF for the various sectors?
“We participate in the preparation of the plans – the IAF participates through the air-ground cooperation unit. I will not tell (the commander of) a ground force what its blue route should be, but I will tell them what air support they may be provided with. They prepare plans according to a certain logic for a specific need. My job, eventually, is to fit in as effectively as I can. The entire IAF participated in Operation Protective Edge – not just the attack helicopter OrBat that supported the battalion commanders. It is the IAF that cooperates with that brigade. The brigade commander says that this particular house should be attacked, and he has the resources of the IAF at his disposal. He knows what a missile launched by an attack helicopter can do and what a 1-ton bomb can do, and now it is up to him to decide. This is the ‘delta’ of the last five and a half years since Operation Cast Lead. This ‘delta’ has placed all of the capabilities of the IAF at the disposal of the ground forces. Today, the commander of the IDF 35th Brigade, for example, can utilize all of the resources of the IAF.”
“What we saw during Operation Protective Edge was maximum utilization of air-land cooperation,” says the commander of the IAF air-ground cooperation unit in an exclusive interview about the future of combined-arms operations
"Additional machine guns on our shoulders,” was how Hertzi HaLevi, commander of the IDF Paratrooper Brigade during Operation Cast Lead (who now serves as Head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate), described the close air support he received from the Cobra attack helicopters of IAF Squadron 160 during that operation.
“A friendly foreign army,” is the humorous way in which the men of the IDF ground forces refer to the IAF: a separate, neater and better organized military force that comes in, bombs the enemy and departs, leaving it to the “Green Uniforms” on the ground to handle the dust and the mess.
The job of Colonel Oren is located half-way between those two statements. Oren, 43, married with three daughters and residing at a community settlement in central Israel, is the commander of the IAF air-ground cooperation unit.
He enlisted in 1990 and joined the IAF. “I found myself flying in the IAF. I had not built flying models as a child and it was not my childhood dream,” says Oren in an interview to Israel
Defense.
He started out as a Cobra attack helicopter pilot and advanced to the position of commander of IAF Squadron 113, the “Hornet” Apache Longbow attack helicopter squadron, deployed at Ramon IAF airbase in the Negev. As an attack helicopter pilot and commander, he took part in a countless number of operations in Lebanon and in other sectors.
During Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, he served as an Apache attack helicopter pilot. IAF Commandant Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel decided, during the operation, on August 23, after the ground operation against the Hamas tunnels had ended, that Oren should be appointed as commander of the IAF air-ground cooperation unit. “In the IAF the mechanisms are sufficiently solid to enable the replacement of commanders even during an on-going operation. This decision proved itself – it is not a case of people who had parachuted into the IAF from outer space.”
How do you conclude the air-ground cooperation during Operation Protective Edge?
“What we saw during Operation Protective Edge was maximum utilization of air-ground cooperation in the context of a highly specific and focused mission, as far as the ground maneuvering aspect was concerned. If the required achievement was hitting the shaft of a tunnel, we knew how to accomplish that. It was an impressive air-ground cooperation effort. The IAF was committed to the participation mission in the view of the ground forces people as well as in the view of the IAF people. It was effective and powerful over a long period of time. Some of the strikes were carried out very close to the ground forces and within short time constants. It was highly effective. Each bomb that we dropped landed where we had intended it to land and where the ground force had intended it to land.
“The distances between our own forces and the targets we engaged, the amounts of ordnance we dropped there and mainly the timeframes were things we had not done before. When a brigade commander wanted a bomb dropped, it was delivered very quickly. The average (response time) was less than one hour, about 45 minutes.”
In a theater of operations like the Gaza Strip, where the life cycle of a target can be a matter of seconds, is it not too long?
“It was not a full hour. The average was 45 minutes. We are going toward very short time intervals. It depends on the maturity of automated systems and it depends on the maturity of personnel training. The process is ready. It depends on the installation of a (software) version at some of the divisions. We practiced it in the context of the divisional training exercise of the IDF 319th Division and the training exercise of the IDF Galilee Formation, the 91st Division. The targets were transmitted by the battalion commander, who had decided that a certain target was threatening him, directly to the aircraft and the mission was executed very quickly.
“This process is made up of the competence of people, the maturity of automated systems and a (common) language. The ‘Green’ system speaks with the ‘Blue’ system. In the battle procedure, there are urgent targets and there are future targets. With the urgent targets we were fairly quick. We are going toward a ten-minute interval with urgent targets. When a brigade commander requests an urgent bombing, he will receive it within ten minutes. This stems from the technological maturity of systems that communicate with one another, the Masu’ah system (the command and control system of the tactical ground forces – O.H.) and the Command and Control system of the IAF. Today, when you press a button of the Masu’ah system to designate a target, this target is uploaded directly to the aircraft. You do not need people in the middle to establish an interface or to provide a map reference. You do need people to supervise the process, however, so that the bomb does not land on our own forces – and people to perform quality assurance, so that the bomb drops on the right house without damaging uninvolved parties.”
Is there apprehension of “friendly fire”situations owing to these prompt fire cycle closures?
“During Operation Protective Edge there were no air-ground ‘friendly fire’ situations as a result of a bomb dropping where we had not intended it to drop. It did not happen because there were people supervising these processes. When you clear your mistakes along the way, you cannot end up in such situations. The amount of ordnance we dropped there was immense. The high success rates were even more dramatic owing to the total absence of errors while at the ‘plant’ itself, I was in charge of the strike process.”
When a ground maneuver begins and the IAF comes in to support the maneuver, what is the actual practice of coordination?
“We are talking about missions involving threats to the forces during the maneuver. When a force maneuvers, they know they have a very powerful air force over them. The attack helicopter layout communicates directly with the battalion commanders on the ground. The support provided by the strike fighter layout is indirect. The battalion commander submits a target through the brigade HQ, the divisional HQ and the forward command post. Today we have reached a situation where the indirect support is, in fact, a shorter process, as the battalion commander designates the target using the Masu’ah system, and the target is assigned to the aircraft within a very short time. We do not currently have a system that knows how to tell the helicopter pilot where to attack, and the launching of munitions from a helicopter necessitates direct communication between the battalion commander and the pilot. It is a different category of targets. The attack helicopter pilot receives the target from the battalion commander. It is the battalion commander’s responsibility to ‘incriminate’ the target and the pilot re-checks that it is logical, that it is not a ‘hands-off’ target, that it is not a hospital or a school and then he will execute. Fighter pilots receive the target data with all of the intelligence evaluations regarding the target.
“There were many incidents during Operation Protective Edge where the control processes took longer. It is a logical dialog. The mission is a joint mission. When a battalion commander requests that a target be attacked it is because that target threatens his forces. If we encounter a problem there, a dialog will begin. The process of assigning a target to a fighter aircraft takes place under fluorescent lights. The controller at the command center is not under any battlefield pressures. He is a professional. He plans the target. He is not looking at the picture through the sights of an M-16 rifle that is currently under threat. It is not a matter of refusing an order but a joint mission and a common target.
“When a bomb explodes close to a ground force, it enables those troopers to raise their heads. During Operation Protective Edge we operated within very close ranges. The effect of the bomb takes place because the bombs we use are very accurate and our control processes are effective. Wherever we provided support within close distances in the context of missions where our forces were under fire, the strikes by the IAF were effective. When a 1-ton bomb drops very close to our own forces, it does a lot on the ground – to the confidence of our own forces as well as to the enemy.”
The IAF participation department is currently working on the fire plans of the IDF regional commands, including the operative plans for the next war. Colonel Oren states proudly that according to the work plan for 2015, the air-ground cooperation unit has a training exercise every week – like the recent training exercise of the IDF Kfir Infantry Brigade and the brigade-level exercise of the IDF Paratroopers Brigade, which ended just a short while prior to the interview.
“My message is a simple one: my unit is present at all of the IDF units in the form of air support representatives, including all of the strike cells of the regional commands. We are an operational unit. In the brigade exercises, I implement the lessons from Operation Protective Edge: effectiveness, quality and time. This is the entire equation. I train my people to be even more competent. Being an airman on the ground is a specialized profession. My people plan target strikes in real time. The personnel of the air-ground cooperation unit consists mainly of reservists. I have to look them in the eye and vouch for their competence – that they are capable of carrying out this mission, and we train them for this purpose. We realized that the automated systems are our primary weapon, and we are currently developing simulators for individual practice of the fire procedures, so that our air support officers will be able to assign a target as quickly as possible, within a few minutes.”
How do you envision the future of the IAF air-ground cooperation unit?
“The future is stronger, faster and more extensively automated. Everything combined means more effective. When I leave this unit eventually, I want my people to be the world champions in their capacity as planners using an automated system. I want each and every person involved in the process to know how to take a request (for support) and convert it into a target as fast and as uniquely as he or she can.
“The reservists are dependent upon the training exercises. We summon them quite frequently. The professional skill is understanding which bomb fitted with which fuse may be dropped within what timeframe where we intended. Pin-pointing the map reference for a precision strike takes time. As an air support officer attached to the divisional HQ you should be able to determine when the target should evolve from a Masu’ah target to an IAF target. Who authorizes it? What should be done before the status changes?”
In the context of the attempt to teach the ground forces what air-launched fire actually means, a training center was established at the air-ground cooperation unit. Lt. Col. Uri, formerly of the Golani Infantry Brigade, is the commander of the training center. They call it “the reform of shortening the response intervals from the moment the request is submitted to the moment when the target is actually attacked.”
“My job is to teach ground operations to IAF personnel and air operations to ground forces personnel,” says Colonel Oren. “We teach people a new language. Everyone speaks Hebrew, but the focus of each force is different. If you fail to teach the pilot at the IAF operational training course about the challenges facing the ground forces, he will never know what they are, and if you fail to teach the officers attending the IDF battalion commander course what the IAF does – you will lose. When I attended the IAF operational training course this had not existed, but today every young combat officer in the IAF is introduced to all of the various layouts: transport, aerial reconnaissance, UAVs, fighter aircraft and attack helicopters. 2,000 commanders attend these training courses each year.”
When you studied ground operations, was there anything that surprised you?
“The challenges facing ground forces commanders are different. A division commander commands thousands of people. He issues a directive that indicates a direction, while I, as an IAF pilot, command my mission end-to-end. The division commander looks at it differently. It is an unfair question as I learned that any subject in which I am not proficient will be difficult for me. It is very difficult to be on the ground. It is complex. Executing a ground maneuver by a division or a brigade is a very, very complex undertaking. It is complex even if no one is firing at you, and it is even more complex when the enemy is firing at you.”
What will the air-ground cooperation look like in the next war?
“According to the directive of the IAF Commandant, the participation mission is regarded as one of the IAF’s primary missions. We need to be more effective. We need to understand the required achievement of the ground forces and make sure that the IAF contributes to the accomplishment of that mission. I think we have excellent tools even today and the air-ground trust has reached an unprecedented level. Trust is not gained through words but through deeds. When you know that someone has submitted a request, it should be fulfilled and if it is not fulfilled, there must be a good reason for it. Trust is the sentimental expression of working together. I am a personal friend of the division commanders and have attended the last division commander course. Trust is established between people. The commander of the IDF 319th Division, the Mapatz Formation, Brig. Gen. Yaakov Benjo, is a personal friend of mine. We speak once a week and I am committed to him. When I met the commander of the IDF 98th Division, Brig. Gen. Amir Baram, I realized that he is one of my clients and I will do anything to help him succeed.”
Does the IAF air-ground cooperation unit take part in the planning of the operative plans of the IDF for the various sectors?
“We participate in the preparation of the plans – the IAF participates through the air-ground cooperation unit. I will not tell (the commander of) a ground force what its blue route should be, but I will tell them what air support they may be provided with. They prepare plans according to a certain logic for a specific need. My job, eventually, is to fit in as effectively as I can. The entire IAF participated in Operation Protective Edge – not just the attack helicopter OrBat that supported the battalion commanders. It is the IAF that cooperates with that brigade. The brigade commander says that this particular house should be attacked, and he has the resources of the IAF at his disposal. He knows what a missile launched by an attack helicopter can do and what a 1-ton bomb can do, and now it is up to him to decide. This is the ‘delta’ of the last five and a half years since Operation Cast Lead. This ‘delta’ has placed all of the capabilities of the IAF at the disposal of the ground forces. Today, the commander of the IDF 35th Brigade, for example, can utilize all of the resources of the IAF.”
