"We Must be Alert and Well-Prepared”
The commanders of the IDF Navy’s routine security squadrons in an exclusive joint interview about the lessons derived from Operation Protective Edge and the challenges of defending Israel’s offshore drilling rigs
Or Heller
| 22/02/2015
It was extremely difficult, nearly downright impossible, convening all three commanders of the IDF Navy’s routine security squadrons to attend the same conversation at the same time and at the same place. One is stationed in Eilat, operating in the Red Sea against attempted terrorist attacks and arms smuggling, the other is stationed in Ashdod, enforcing the naval blockade on the Gaza Strip pursuant to Operation Protective Edge, and the third one is stationed in Haifa, sailing all the way to Lebanon on a daily basis, possibly in preparation for the third Lebanon war in view of the recent escalation along the northern borders. One thing is certain: even after Operation Protective Edge, the Navy’s routine security squadrons have their hands full.
We begin this review by referring to the southernmost point where IDF elements are deployed – on the Red Sea.
The commander of the IDF Navy’s 915th Routine Security Squadron, the Red Sea Squadron, is Major Steven Gordon. “I took part in all of the rounds of fighting of the last few years. During Operation Protective Edge, I was the commander of the Sa’ar-4.5 missile frigate INS Keshet, operating in the Mediterranean Sea and opposite the Gaza Strip. We provided support for IDF elements on land and defended the offshore drilling rigs – everything we were required to do, especially with regard to the defensive aspect.
“The 915th Squadron’s mission is to defend the city of Eilat and all of the elements thereof, including the local residents and the tourism activities,” he recounts in a conversation with Israel Defense. “The primary challenge faced by this squadron, unlike the other squadrons, involves the crowded space around the vessels and around the theater. There are vessels out there that can approach and violate the tranquility in Eilat with regard to the local population as well as with regard to the tourism aspect. Eilat is known as a holiday resort and in the summer the beaches here are extremely crowded. We should safeguard them against terrorism and the approach of hostile vessels.
“As we are in a state of good neighborly relations and peace with Egypt and with Jordan, our primary concern are the terrorists. We cooperate closely with the Israel Police, the Border Guard and the infantry elements of the IDF. The Klos C arms ship ended up in Eilat and the Karine A arms ship had also ended up in Eilat. We have preventive operations under way all the time. We prevent crossing attempts in advance, so that they do not develop into terrorist attacks. Today, one of our major challenges is preventing smuggling. Every personal watercraft and speedboat is a potential smuggling vessel – as we have seen in recent years.
“We are fully deployed 24/7, regardless of sea conditions, including Saturdays and holidays. During periods of actual fighting, we reinforce according to the intelligence we receive – we hone our deployment. The vessels are at sea, safeguarding Eilat.”
What did the Red Sea Theater look like during Operation Protective Edge?
“The center of combat activities was not here in our theater, but we stepped up our activity and were on the alert for rocket attacks against Eilat and for dealing with any evil – wherever it may come from. We cooperate closely with the IAF and the Iron Dome battery deployed in Eilat and help with the shoreline patrols.”
Where does your cooperation and security coordination with the Egyptian Navy in the theater stand during this so-called "honeymoon" with the el-Sisi regime?
“We speak to the Jordanians as well as to the Egyptians on a daily basis, as well as during incidents on our side and on their side. We never rest on our laurels when we see an Egyptian vessel or a Jordanian vessel during an incident, as an attacker could have taken control of one of their vessels. We assist one another and this cooperation enables me to seal the theater properly.”
As a routine security squadron, how far into the Red Sea do you sail?
“In the context of operational activity, we know how to reach any point, but during routine security operations we remain within our territorial waters. We can operate throughout the Red Sea Theater. Because I want to maintain 24/7 routine security, I remain here in my sector, but the coverage of our Radar and electronic resources extends beyond the sector.
“Occasionally, we refresh our competence and head south beyond Sharem el-Sheik, about 100 nautical miles, and study the activity of the merchant ships sailing these waters. It is a good area for training activities. Here we have training restrictions and resources that we cannot employ, so we head south to the Straits of Gubal – the area where the Red Sea meets the Suez Canal.”
What can you say about the status picture regarding arms smuggling from Iran into our region through your theater – the Red Sea?
“The Red Sea Theater provides logistic support for the Navy’s anti-smuggling efforts. Our squadron provides defense inside the territorial waters. In the event that we are required to go beyond that limit, we will board vessels for questioning purposes. Any vessel regarding which there is any doubt, we will identify the vehicle and check the crew members by name, one by one. This applies mainly to ships from the Far East, fuel containers coming in, almost everything that arrives in the Mediterranean comes through the Red Sea.”
How does the Navy contribute to the efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and rocket fire from the Sinai toward Eilat?
“Admittedly, we are at peace with Egypt, but we fully understand that a terrorist attacker may arrive from there at any opportunity. When the ground fence system along the border with Egypt is completed, we are aware that the smuggling activity could be transferred to the sea. Nothing has managed to come in or pass through us. I believe they will try. Our job is to prevent the smugglers from doing their job.”
Are you preparing at the Eilat sector for a terrorist attack from the sea in view of the incident in Zikim during Operation Protective Edge?
“I know very well what’s going on around here, and would seriously avoid any attempt to infiltrate from the Sinai or from Jordan. We are deployed on the shore as well, and I would not suggest to anyone to put our alertness to the test. That incident has definitely honed our alertness. Like any other incident, in the Navy we draw conclusions and lessons for future incidents.”
“Smuggling from the Sea has intensified”
The Navy’s 916th Routine Security Squadron is stationed at the Navy base in Ashdod, under command of Lt. Col. Liav Zilberman. “I started out in the naval officer cadet course. I grew up on board the Dvora fast patrol boats and converted to missile frigates. I was the commander of the missile frigate INS Herev and also traveled overseas to study at the US Naval Academy.”
What was Operation Protective Edge like for you?
“I am a ‘fresh’ squadron commander – my appointment became effective only a month ago (after the end of Operation Protective Edge – O.H.), during Operation Protective Edge, I was having my orientation training. We had predated the orientation training process. Eventually, I saw the emergency operations and the implementation of the operative plans firsthand and sailed on board many vessels, so that I had the chance to experience many things and cut the planned orientation time short, so that we could predate the actual changeover by a week.
“This unit operates opposite the Gaza Strip all the time, performing routine security missions. It possesses fire directing and support capabilities. The first week of the operation consisted almost exclusively of attacks by IAF and the Navy, and following that was the peak of combined operations and support for the ground forces. By now we have completed the debriefing and analysis process and every brigade commander and battalion commander in the sector is familiar with the 916th Squadron. One other aspect consisted of the special operations with the 13th Flotilla (Naval Commandos) and other units. Additionally, there was an operation that involved support for a 13th Flotilla detachment on the ground. That was in al-Sudaniya.
“A running engagement took place, and support was provided by the Dvora boats. We fired our Typhoon gun systems, which are highly accurate and possess both night and day target engagement capabilities. You come in to within very close ranges, and we fired quite a lot over there. As far as I am concerned, if I have a (rocket) launcher on my crosshairs, I will hit it, and during the operation we hit launchers and targets that were in our line of fire. During the operation, we also employed the naval version of the Tamuz (Spike) missile,” he recounts.
Are you concerned about the possibility of another terrorist attack such as the one Hamas had staged in Zikim?
“Just before the incident in Zikim we were in Ashdod. Pursuant to intelligence information we received, we put Dvora fast patrol boats to sea. You can see Typhoon gun and MAG machine gun fire in the clips that were publicized. We managed to kill two of the terrorists from the Hamas naval detachment.”
Were you fired upon during the fighting?
“On several occasions we came under machine gun and small arms fire when we approached the shore to engage enemy targets. We returned fire toward the sources of this fire. We exerted a lot of pressure so they were unable to produce anything more substantial.”
What about the naval threat imposed on the Israeli offshore gas drilling rigs in the Mediterranean Sea?
“Immediately following Operation Protective Edge, the Palestinians went back to commercial fishing. We enforce fishing bans in order to prevent irregularities. At this time the fishing zone range is six miles. The Palestinians requested that it be extended to 12 miles. Such extension will produce an operational problem, as it would place them substantially closer to the Tethys and Tamar offshore rigs, while we maintain a very intensive defensive effort around those rigs. It will shorten our response intervals. One should bear in mind the fact that the drilling rigs are located 16 miles off shore. One other thing – an extension of the fishing zone will enable the Palestinians to link up with smuggling vessels coming from the outside, for example – arms smuggling from Syria.
“However, we would execute whatever the Government of Israel will decide. As the Navy, we place the implications on the table and will handle any decision.”
“There is no ActualFence at Sea”
“The function of this squadron is to provide security to the northern settlements. To guard the northern border from Rosh Hanikra (in the north) all the way south,” is how the commander of the IDF Navy’s 914th Squadron, Lt. Col. Ronen Hajaj, delineated the boundaries of the sector assigned to his responsibility. “The hotter and more relevant section is the area near Rosh Hanikra. This routine is a very tense one. It is a routine where you are fully aware that the other side is engaged in procurement, outfitting, planning – but outwardly everything is quiet and there are vacationers and holidaymakers while the danger lurks just a few meters away from all the civilians out there. It is a very tense tranquility and sometimes it is interrupted.
“We must be alert and well-prepared at all times. There is no actual fence at sea, and we must seal the sector using radar resources in order to detect divers and have people constantly observing the systems and examining and vessels out at sea all the time, ready to scramble and intercept, winter and summer.”
What was last summer like for you?
“We cut back a major portion of our force. We left only what we needed and reinforced the southern sector. Almost all of our vessels participated in the fighting in the Gaza Strip and we were very active down there. We participated in the fighting in the south but did not neglect our alert in the north, ‘á la guerre comme á la guerre’. Everyone is out at sea and no one goes home. The guys were very satisfied as they felt they had given a lot of themselves. Whatever the crews in Ashdod had experienced, my crews experienced as well: providing cover to complex operations, including sea-to-shore fire from the vessels to targets on the shore, and other operations from the sea that required our presence there.”
Did you take anything with you from the operations in Gaza to the Lebanon sector?
“The story of the fire attacks from the sea is a capability we had had in the north long before it was employed in the south. Over here, this capability has been used since 2000 and, quite naturally, the guys over here are much more accurate. The sea is the sea and the shore is the shore and we derived many lessons regarding attacks against targets on the shore using gun fire and missiles to be implemented in the north. It is no secret that the threats imposed on naval vessels in the south are far less severe than the threats we face in the northern sector. The northern sector is much more threatening. Shore-to-sea missiles, antitank missiles and guns that may be used to engage naval targets. Hezbollah has everything planned regarding guns and the deployment of naval radars. The south is nothing compared to the threat we are expecting in the north.
“We have been practicing our role in providing support to the ground maneuver in Lebanon very intensively, and the guys in the north will receive from the Navy a solution in the form of close support for their ground maneuver, including the clearing of routes of advance and anything else they may require. That is what we used to do before the pull-out (from Lebanon) in 2000: every convoy entering Lebanon along the coastal route received our support in the clearing of the route as part of the routine security procedure. We clear the route and then give the infantry the OK to advance.
“The northern border is far less stable. The routine security operations are highly dynamic and every week we have a fresh situation appraisal in view of the intelligence received. We have upgraded our diver spotting capabilities. Hezbollah has a naval unit that includes divers. This story of the underwater activity was a vulnerability until about a year ago, but today we have addressed this issue, too. The post at Rosh Hanikra seals the entire area just as we require when the alert state is raised.
“The feeling here is that the border is not stable at all and that the tranquility in Rosh Hanikra is misleading. Just a few meters away Hezbollah observes, collects intelligence and prepares. Routine security is something you do every day, all day. I ask the commanders in my unit to regard every routine security patrol as their first patrol – to maintain operational tension even when the tranquility is maintained, when the sector is quiet and Lebanese boats do not deviate and do not cross the border. You can find yourself on a 48-hour patrol watch without firing a single round. If they manage to pass us, they will be able to stage an attack in less than a minute. On land, a terrorist can attack from a few meters away, through the fence, and there is nothing you can do about it. If someone starts up the engines and attempts to land on our shore, it will be just a matter of seconds. Whether I succeed in intercepting them or not is a matter of seconds.
Did you derive any lessons from the incident in Zikim?
“We beefed up the weapon system arrays vis-à-vis the aspect of diver detection – detecting diver vehicles and everything else under water. A Dvora fast patrol boat alone at sea, without a shore base station that controls and assembles a status picture, is restricted by its on-board capabilities. As far as our operational doctrine is concerned, we derived lessons regarding underwater explosive charges, and the Dvora fast patrol boats now carry underwater explosive charges that can kill divers. When the Hamas terrorists landed in Zikim, they landed at a locality where the military was deployed and ready. In the Rosh Hanikra sector, the equivalent of Kibbutz Zikim, as far as I am concerned, are the bathers on the beach and Kibbutz Rosh Hanikra. You just land and you’re there, and we cannot afford the privilege of allowing them to land. We must handle them while they are still out at sea.”
What about the task of defending the offshore gas drilling rigs?
“The Navy is making an extra effort with regard to the task of defending the offshore drilling rigs against shore-to-sea missiles and terrorist attacks. The defensive plan for the rigs is progressing at its own pace. In the context of a war against Hezbollah, we will be prepared and deployed to defend the offshore rigs as well. During Operation Protective Edge we invested considerable efforts in defending the rigs.”
The commanders of the IDF Navy’s routine security squadrons in an exclusive joint interview about the lessons derived from Operation Protective Edge and the challenges of defending Israel’s offshore drilling rigs
It was extremely difficult, nearly downright impossible, convening all three commanders of the IDF Navy’s routine security squadrons to attend the same conversation at the same time and at the same place. One is stationed in Eilat, operating in the Red Sea against attempted terrorist attacks and arms smuggling, the other is stationed in Ashdod, enforcing the naval blockade on the Gaza Strip pursuant to Operation Protective Edge, and the third one is stationed in Haifa, sailing all the way to Lebanon on a daily basis, possibly in preparation for the third Lebanon war in view of the recent escalation along the northern borders. One thing is certain: even after Operation Protective Edge, the Navy’s routine security squadrons have their hands full.
We begin this review by referring to the southernmost point where IDF elements are deployed – on the Red Sea.
The commander of the IDF Navy’s 915th Routine Security Squadron, the Red Sea Squadron, is Major Steven Gordon. “I took part in all of the rounds of fighting of the last few years. During Operation Protective Edge, I was the commander of the Sa’ar-4.5 missile frigate INS Keshet, operating in the Mediterranean Sea and opposite the Gaza Strip. We provided support for IDF elements on land and defended the offshore drilling rigs – everything we were required to do, especially with regard to the defensive aspect.
“The 915th Squadron’s mission is to defend the city of Eilat and all of the elements thereof, including the local residents and the tourism activities,” he recounts in a conversation with Israel Defense. “The primary challenge faced by this squadron, unlike the other squadrons, involves the crowded space around the vessels and around the theater. There are vessels out there that can approach and violate the tranquility in Eilat with regard to the local population as well as with regard to the tourism aspect. Eilat is known as a holiday resort and in the summer the beaches here are extremely crowded. We should safeguard them against terrorism and the approach of hostile vessels.
“As we are in a state of good neighborly relations and peace with Egypt and with Jordan, our primary concern are the terrorists. We cooperate closely with the Israel Police, the Border Guard and the infantry elements of the IDF. The Klos C arms ship ended up in Eilat and the Karine A arms ship had also ended up in Eilat. We have preventive operations under way all the time. We prevent crossing attempts in advance, so that they do not develop into terrorist attacks. Today, one of our major challenges is preventing smuggling. Every personal watercraft and speedboat is a potential smuggling vessel – as we have seen in recent years.
“We are fully deployed 24/7, regardless of sea conditions, including Saturdays and holidays. During periods of actual fighting, we reinforce according to the intelligence we receive – we hone our deployment. The vessels are at sea, safeguarding Eilat.”
What did the Red Sea Theater look like during Operation Protective Edge?
“The center of combat activities was not here in our theater, but we stepped up our activity and were on the alert for rocket attacks against Eilat and for dealing with any evil – wherever it may come from. We cooperate closely with the IAF and the Iron Dome battery deployed in Eilat and help with the shoreline patrols.”
Where does your cooperation and security coordination with the Egyptian Navy in the theater stand during this so-called "honeymoon" with the el-Sisi regime?
“We speak to the Jordanians as well as to the Egyptians on a daily basis, as well as during incidents on our side and on their side. We never rest on our laurels when we see an Egyptian vessel or a Jordanian vessel during an incident, as an attacker could have taken control of one of their vessels. We assist one another and this cooperation enables me to seal the theater properly.”
As a routine security squadron, how far into the Red Sea do you sail?
“In the context of operational activity, we know how to reach any point, but during routine security operations we remain within our territorial waters. We can operate throughout the Red Sea Theater. Because I want to maintain 24/7 routine security, I remain here in my sector, but the coverage of our Radar and electronic resources extends beyond the sector.
“Occasionally, we refresh our competence and head south beyond Sharem el-Sheik, about 100 nautical miles, and study the activity of the merchant ships sailing these waters. It is a good area for training activities. Here we have training restrictions and resources that we cannot employ, so we head south to the Straits of Gubal – the area where the Red Sea meets the Suez Canal.”
What can you say about the status picture regarding arms smuggling from Iran into our region through your theater – the Red Sea?
“The Red Sea Theater provides logistic support for the Navy’s anti-smuggling efforts. Our squadron provides defense inside the territorial waters. In the event that we are required to go beyond that limit, we will board vessels for questioning purposes. Any vessel regarding which there is any doubt, we will identify the vehicle and check the crew members by name, one by one. This applies mainly to ships from the Far East, fuel containers coming in, almost everything that arrives in the Mediterranean comes through the Red Sea.”
How does the Navy contribute to the efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and rocket fire from the Sinai toward Eilat?
“Admittedly, we are at peace with Egypt, but we fully understand that a terrorist attacker may arrive from there at any opportunity. When the ground fence system along the border with Egypt is completed, we are aware that the smuggling activity could be transferred to the sea. Nothing has managed to come in or pass through us. I believe they will try. Our job is to prevent the smugglers from doing their job.”
Are you preparing at the Eilat sector for a terrorist attack from the sea in view of the incident in Zikim during Operation Protective Edge?
“I know very well what’s going on around here, and would seriously avoid any attempt to infiltrate from the Sinai or from Jordan. We are deployed on the shore as well, and I would not suggest to anyone to put our alertness to the test. That incident has definitely honed our alertness. Like any other incident, in the Navy we draw conclusions and lessons for future incidents.”
“Smuggling from the Sea has intensified”
The Navy’s 916th Routine Security Squadron is stationed at the Navy base in Ashdod, under command of Lt. Col. Liav Zilberman. “I started out in the naval officer cadet course. I grew up on board the Dvora fast patrol boats and converted to missile frigates. I was the commander of the missile frigate INS Herev and also traveled overseas to study at the US Naval Academy.”
What was Operation Protective Edge like for you?
“I am a ‘fresh’ squadron commander – my appointment became effective only a month ago (after the end of Operation Protective Edge – O.H.), during Operation Protective Edge, I was having my orientation training. We had predated the orientation training process. Eventually, I saw the emergency operations and the implementation of the operative plans firsthand and sailed on board many vessels, so that I had the chance to experience many things and cut the planned orientation time short, so that we could predate the actual changeover by a week.
“This unit operates opposite the Gaza Strip all the time, performing routine security missions. It possesses fire directing and support capabilities. The first week of the operation consisted almost exclusively of attacks by IAF and the Navy, and following that was the peak of combined operations and support for the ground forces. By now we have completed the debriefing and analysis process and every brigade commander and battalion commander in the sector is familiar with the 916th Squadron. One other aspect consisted of the special operations with the 13th Flotilla (Naval Commandos) and other units. Additionally, there was an operation that involved support for a 13th Flotilla detachment on the ground. That was in al-Sudaniya.
“A running engagement took place, and support was provided by the Dvora boats. We fired our Typhoon gun systems, which are highly accurate and possess both night and day target engagement capabilities. You come in to within very close ranges, and we fired quite a lot over there. As far as I am concerned, if I have a (rocket) launcher on my crosshairs, I will hit it, and during the operation we hit launchers and targets that were in our line of fire. During the operation, we also employed the naval version of the Tamuz (Spike) missile,” he recounts.
Are you concerned about the possibility of another terrorist attack such as the one Hamas had staged in Zikim?
“Just before the incident in Zikim we were in Ashdod. Pursuant to intelligence information we received, we put Dvora fast patrol boats to sea. You can see Typhoon gun and MAG machine gun fire in the clips that were publicized. We managed to kill two of the terrorists from the Hamas naval detachment.”
Were you fired upon during the fighting?
“On several occasions we came under machine gun and small arms fire when we approached the shore to engage enemy targets. We returned fire toward the sources of this fire. We exerted a lot of pressure so they were unable to produce anything more substantial.”
What about the naval threat imposed on the Israeli offshore gas drilling rigs in the Mediterranean Sea?
“Immediately following Operation Protective Edge, the Palestinians went back to commercial fishing. We enforce fishing bans in order to prevent irregularities. At this time the fishing zone range is six miles. The Palestinians requested that it be extended to 12 miles. Such extension will produce an operational problem, as it would place them substantially closer to the Tethys and Tamar offshore rigs, while we maintain a very intensive defensive effort around those rigs. It will shorten our response intervals. One should bear in mind the fact that the drilling rigs are located 16 miles off shore. One other thing – an extension of the fishing zone will enable the Palestinians to link up with smuggling vessels coming from the outside, for example – arms smuggling from Syria.
“However, we would execute whatever the Government of Israel will decide. As the Navy, we place the implications on the table and will handle any decision.”
“There is no ActualFence at Sea”
“The function of this squadron is to provide security to the northern settlements. To guard the northern border from Rosh Hanikra (in the north) all the way south,” is how the commander of the IDF Navy’s 914th Squadron, Lt. Col. Ronen Hajaj, delineated the boundaries of the sector assigned to his responsibility. “The hotter and more relevant section is the area near Rosh Hanikra. This routine is a very tense one. It is a routine where you are fully aware that the other side is engaged in procurement, outfitting, planning – but outwardly everything is quiet and there are vacationers and holidaymakers while the danger lurks just a few meters away from all the civilians out there. It is a very tense tranquility and sometimes it is interrupted.
“We must be alert and well-prepared at all times. There is no actual fence at sea, and we must seal the sector using radar resources in order to detect divers and have people constantly observing the systems and examining and vessels out at sea all the time, ready to scramble and intercept, winter and summer.”
What was last summer like for you?
“We cut back a major portion of our force. We left only what we needed and reinforced the southern sector. Almost all of our vessels participated in the fighting in the Gaza Strip and we were very active down there. We participated in the fighting in the south but did not neglect our alert in the north, ‘á la guerre comme á la guerre’. Everyone is out at sea and no one goes home. The guys were very satisfied as they felt they had given a lot of themselves. Whatever the crews in Ashdod had experienced, my crews experienced as well: providing cover to complex operations, including sea-to-shore fire from the vessels to targets on the shore, and other operations from the sea that required our presence there.”
Did you take anything with you from the operations in Gaza to the Lebanon sector?
“The story of the fire attacks from the sea is a capability we had had in the north long before it was employed in the south. Over here, this capability has been used since 2000 and, quite naturally, the guys over here are much more accurate. The sea is the sea and the shore is the shore and we derived many lessons regarding attacks against targets on the shore using gun fire and missiles to be implemented in the north. It is no secret that the threats imposed on naval vessels in the south are far less severe than the threats we face in the northern sector. The northern sector is much more threatening. Shore-to-sea missiles, antitank missiles and guns that may be used to engage naval targets. Hezbollah has everything planned regarding guns and the deployment of naval radars. The south is nothing compared to the threat we are expecting in the north.
“We have been practicing our role in providing support to the ground maneuver in Lebanon very intensively, and the guys in the north will receive from the Navy a solution in the form of close support for their ground maneuver, including the clearing of routes of advance and anything else they may require. That is what we used to do before the pull-out (from Lebanon) in 2000: every convoy entering Lebanon along the coastal route received our support in the clearing of the route as part of the routine security procedure. We clear the route and then give the infantry the OK to advance.
“The northern border is far less stable. The routine security operations are highly dynamic and every week we have a fresh situation appraisal in view of the intelligence received. We have upgraded our diver spotting capabilities. Hezbollah has a naval unit that includes divers. This story of the underwater activity was a vulnerability until about a year ago, but today we have addressed this issue, too. The post at Rosh Hanikra seals the entire area just as we require when the alert state is raised.
“The feeling here is that the border is not stable at all and that the tranquility in Rosh Hanikra is misleading. Just a few meters away Hezbollah observes, collects intelligence and prepares. Routine security is something you do every day, all day. I ask the commanders in my unit to regard every routine security patrol as their first patrol – to maintain operational tension even when the tranquility is maintained, when the sector is quiet and Lebanese boats do not deviate and do not cross the border. You can find yourself on a 48-hour patrol watch without firing a single round. If they manage to pass us, they will be able to stage an attack in less than a minute. On land, a terrorist can attack from a few meters away, through the fence, and there is nothing you can do about it. If someone starts up the engines and attempts to land on our shore, it will be just a matter of seconds. Whether I succeed in intercepting them or not is a matter of seconds.
Did you derive any lessons from the incident in Zikim?
“We beefed up the weapon system arrays vis-à-vis the aspect of diver detection – detecting diver vehicles and everything else under water. A Dvora fast patrol boat alone at sea, without a shore base station that controls and assembles a status picture, is restricted by its on-board capabilities. As far as our operational doctrine is concerned, we derived lessons regarding underwater explosive charges, and the Dvora fast patrol boats now carry underwater explosive charges that can kill divers. When the Hamas terrorists landed in Zikim, they landed at a locality where the military was deployed and ready. In the Rosh Hanikra sector, the equivalent of Kibbutz Zikim, as far as I am concerned, are the bathers on the beach and Kibbutz Rosh Hanikra. You just land and you’re there, and we cannot afford the privilege of allowing them to land. We must handle them while they are still out at sea.”
What about the task of defending the offshore gas drilling rigs?
“The Navy is making an extra effort with regard to the task of defending the offshore drilling rigs against shore-to-sea missiles and terrorist attacks. The defensive plan for the rigs is progressing at its own pace. In the context of a war against Hezbollah, we will be prepared and deployed to defend the offshore rigs as well. During Operation Protective Edge we invested considerable efforts in defending the rigs.”
