Iran Threatens to Deploy Fishing Militia Based on Chinese Doctrine
The militia comprises 33,000 fully recruited fishing boats, an additional 55,000 volunteer boats as needed, and additional fishing boats operating in the Tanzania region
Cmdr. (res.) Eyal Pinko
| 25/12/2023
fishing boats in the harbour, Hormozgan, Bandar-e Kong, Iran. Photo credit: Eric Lafforgue / Hans Lucas via Reuters Connect
At the end of December 2023, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Navy announced the establishment of a new branch that includes a maritime fishermen militia, which will operate thousands of large fishing boats.
The militia’s purpose is to serve as a primary base for intelligence gathering and to build a maritime presence far from the Iranian coast. It also aims to enhance the firepower and attack capabilities of the Revolutionary Guards' Navy, with a focus on countering the American Navy.
The fishermen militia, or the Maritime Basij, is expected to operate from the Hormuz Strait through the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, and up to the Horn of Africa. The militia's fishing boats will be armed with machine guns, light weapons, and 107mm rockets.
The fishermen, members of the militia, underwent training conducted by the Revolutionary Guards' Navy. According to its commander, the militia comprises around 33,000 fully recruited fishing boats, an additional 55,000 volunteer boats as needed, and additional fishing boats operating in the Tanzania region.
It should be noted that according to international maritime law, warships are prohibited from opening fire or boarding civilian vessels without justification and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The U.S. Navy will refrain from taking action against such civilian vessels.
The activation of the maritime militia involves adopting the doctrine of the Chinese Navy, which operates similarly against the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea.
The Iranians operate a relatively large but somewhat outdated fleet operating far from the Hormuz Strait with diverse capabilities, alongside the Revolutionary Guards' Navy, which primarily operates in the Hormuz Strait and the Persian Gulf.
Since the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the Iranians have been nurturing the Revolutionary Guards' Navy, which operates thousands of small craft, mostly fast attack boats with missile capabilities against naval vessels and torpedoes, and dozens of midget submarines.
The Iranian maritime militias represent an escalation in the asymmetric warfare capability of the Revolutionary Guards' Navy, whether for intelligence gathering, demonstrating presence, harassing the U.S. Navy, or attacking merchant vessels.
In the past few weeks, several shipping companies have reported changes in their maritime routes from Africa to Europe, stating that they will not pass through the Bab al-Mandab and the Suez Canal following multiple attacks by Houthi rebels from Yemen.
The maritime routes have changed, and they will now pass through the Cape of Good Hope, circumnavigating Africa. Iranian fishermen militias operating in the Tanzania region may also disrupt the alternative maritime route, affecting the movement of merchant ships in the area and causing even more economic damage than that currently inflicted by Houthi attacks.
The U.S. Navy and other navies operating in the operational zones of the Iranian militias will face challenges in identifying and categorizing fishing boats as a threat (or as innocuous), as well as in taking action against them. Identifying Iranian boats will require extensive and prolonged intelligence, which the U.S. Navy will need to gather to operate in the affected regions.
It would be advisable for Israel’s naval intelligence to establish a database and ongoing intelligence about the activities of the Iranian militias, their maritime assets' locations, operational patterns, weaponry, and their force structure. It will be important to monitor whether the fishing militias will also operate in Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, so that future terrorist attacks in the area directly by the Iranians can be thwarted.
The militia comprises 33,000 fully recruited fishing boats, an additional 55,000 volunteer boats as needed, and additional fishing boats operating in the Tanzania region
fishing boats in the harbour, Hormozgan, Bandar-e Kong, Iran. Photo credit: Eric Lafforgue / Hans Lucas via Reuters Connect
At the end of December 2023, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Navy announced the establishment of a new branch that includes a maritime fishermen militia, which will operate thousands of large fishing boats.
The militia’s purpose is to serve as a primary base for intelligence gathering and to build a maritime presence far from the Iranian coast. It also aims to enhance the firepower and attack capabilities of the Revolutionary Guards' Navy, with a focus on countering the American Navy.
The fishermen militia, or the Maritime Basij, is expected to operate from the Hormuz Strait through the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, and up to the Horn of Africa. The militia's fishing boats will be armed with machine guns, light weapons, and 107mm rockets.
The fishermen, members of the militia, underwent training conducted by the Revolutionary Guards' Navy. According to its commander, the militia comprises around 33,000 fully recruited fishing boats, an additional 55,000 volunteer boats as needed, and additional fishing boats operating in the Tanzania region.
It should be noted that according to international maritime law, warships are prohibited from opening fire or boarding civilian vessels without justification and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The U.S. Navy will refrain from taking action against such civilian vessels.
The activation of the maritime militia involves adopting the doctrine of the Chinese Navy, which operates similarly against the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea.
The Iranians operate a relatively large but somewhat outdated fleet operating far from the Hormuz Strait with diverse capabilities, alongside the Revolutionary Guards' Navy, which primarily operates in the Hormuz Strait and the Persian Gulf.
Since the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the Iranians have been nurturing the Revolutionary Guards' Navy, which operates thousands of small craft, mostly fast attack boats with missile capabilities against naval vessels and torpedoes, and dozens of midget submarines.
The Iranian maritime militias represent an escalation in the asymmetric warfare capability of the Revolutionary Guards' Navy, whether for intelligence gathering, demonstrating presence, harassing the U.S. Navy, or attacking merchant vessels.
In the past few weeks, several shipping companies have reported changes in their maritime routes from Africa to Europe, stating that they will not pass through the Bab al-Mandab and the Suez Canal following multiple attacks by Houthi rebels from Yemen.
The maritime routes have changed, and they will now pass through the Cape of Good Hope, circumnavigating Africa. Iranian fishermen militias operating in the Tanzania region may also disrupt the alternative maritime route, affecting the movement of merchant ships in the area and causing even more economic damage than that currently inflicted by Houthi attacks.
The U.S. Navy and other navies operating in the operational zones of the Iranian militias will face challenges in identifying and categorizing fishing boats as a threat (or as innocuous), as well as in taking action against them. Identifying Iranian boats will require extensive and prolonged intelligence, which the U.S. Navy will need to gather to operate in the affected regions.
It would be advisable for Israel’s naval intelligence to establish a database and ongoing intelligence about the activities of the Iranian militias, their maritime assets' locations, operational patterns, weaponry, and their force structure. It will be important to monitor whether the fishing militias will also operate in Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, so that future terrorist attacks in the area directly by the Iranians can be thwarted.
