The US Aid Agreement is More Imminent than Ever

This time, it appears to be more serious than before: there is a good chance that within the next few days, an official announcement will be made regarding the new long-term US Aid agreement between the USA and Israel. But whether or not such announcement is released, on the following week, the Deputy Head of the National Security Council, Jacob Nagel, will depart for Washington to finalize the deal.

In order to fully understand the significance of Nagel's forthcoming trip to Washington, here is a summary of the previous chapters in this saga. The new US Aid agreement should have been signed many months ago and come into effect in 2017. In October of next year, the previous 10-year agreement will come to an end (the agreement should be signed well in advance as IDF are relying on US Aid funds to finance their long-term procurement from the USA. Without the promise of US Aid funds, Israel would not be able to finance such mega-deals as the acquisition of new fighter aircraft).

The factor that caused the generous US Aid agreement to go sour and cloud the relations between Jerusalem and Washington was the nuclear agreement between the superpowers and Iran, signed a year ago. According to most estimates, prior to the signature of the agreement with Iran, President Obama was willing to substantially increase the amount allocated to Israel, first and foremost as a compensation for the fact that the USA intends to sell hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of arms to countries in the Arabian Peninsula, notably Saudi Arabia (which, in itself, constitutes a counterweight to the Iranian arms race pursuant to the agreement). After Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke openly against the nuclear agreement at the US Congress, the USA became much tougher regarding the various clauses of the US Aid agreement.

Either way, the dialog between the Israeli Ministry of Defense and the Pentagon regarding Israel's future defense needs was concluded many months ago. In this dialog, the parties did not specify numbers, as the Prime Minister conducted the negotiations personally through the National Security Council subordinated to him directly.

As the agreement had not been signed over the course of 2015 and the first half of 2016, the Israeli authorities hoped that the US administration would be more generous toward Israel in anticipation of the presidential elections – which does not seem to be the case. In any case, Israel's best interest appears to be signing the agreement before Washington becomes completely engulfed in the election campaign, as the elected administration would require a few months to settle in and it is by no means certain that the next administration would be more generous to Israel than the Obama administration (which financed the Iron Dome program and several other development projects through additional funding, outside the framework of the US Aid agreement).

A change of regime in the USA does not necessarily guarantee good fortune for Israel regarding the US Aid agreement: admittedly Donald Trump, the Republican nominee, often speaks out against Muslims, but his policy will strive to minimize US involvement worldwide and have each and every situation assessed, first and foremost, through the perspective of American interests.

In view of all of the above, it appears that both parties will aspire to put an end to this on-going saga by signing the new agreement before the end of August 2016.

What will the new agreement include? The annual aid amount will probably be increased by 20% minimum, compared to the annual total of US$ 3 billion according to the previous agreement, but the agreement will contain some 'bugs' as far as Israel is concerned: over the course of the last few weeks there were quite a few reports according to which Israel would not be able to change some of the US Aid funds into ILS. Allegedly, this will have an adverse effect on procurement from the Israeli defense industries. These reports have a kernel of truth but not much more, and apparently, the effect of this restriction on the Israeli defense industries will be negligible. In any case, the complete details of the new US Aid agreement are expected to be publicized very soon.

Question Marks in the North

As in the case of the reports regarding the pending US Aid agreement, the reports regarding the alleged attempt to intercept an unmanned aerial vehicle in northern Israel last week should also be treated with suspicion. These are the only certain facts: a UAV did intrude into Israeli airspace, it had been launched from Lebanon through the Syrian Golan Heights, and left Israeli airspace undamaged. That is all.

All the other details have been a matter of speculation rather than fact, among other reasons – because both IDF and Hezbollah kept completely silent about the incident. Why? It is reasonable to assume that at this point, the top priority of both parties is collecting information: Hezbollah is keenly interested in the IDF's defensive capabilities against UAVs, while the IDF are keenly interested in the UAV arsenals operating in this region (including the UAV arsenal of Hamas).

Under such circumstances, the launching of two Patriot missiles at the intruding UAV or an attempted interception by fighter aircraft may have occurred differently than what the media reports portrayed. Apparently, the highest echelons in Israel were aware of the UAV intrusion in real time, but IAF may have preferred to find out more about this vehicle or attempt to control it rather than destroying it. A similar consideration was speculatively reported when a Hezbollah UAV had intruded from Lebanon last year. At that time, the UAV crashed in the southern part of Mount Hebron after about ninety minutes inside Israeli airspace.

Either way, Hezbollah's miniature, fast UAVs will present a major challenge to IAF as well as to the IDF ground forces during the next confrontation.

Incidentally, another troublesome intrusion into Israel occurred recently. A mentally disturbed Jordanian citizen crossed the border without difficulty. He was shot and killed only after having wandered 2.5 kilometers into Israeli territory. His intrusion took place exactly at the 'seam' between the sectors of IDF Northern Command and IDF Central Command, on the southern slopes of the Golan Heights, and it should raise questions regarding the alertness of the forces along this section of the border.

The Man-Made Island

Another development of the last week: Minister of Intelligence Israel Katz has campaigned vigorously for the establishment of a man-man island opposite the coast of Gaza, with the intention of refuting the allegations that Israel maintains a naval and aerial blockade on the Gaza Strip. The island may be used for inspecting goods being shipped to the Gaza Strip – a process that currently takes place at the Port of Ashdod. Minister Katz extolled the virtues of the island program in an address he delivered at the International Intelligence Conference last Tuesday. The issue of the man-made island is to be addressed by the Israeli cabinet within the near future. The IDF, Mossad and the National Security Council are unequivocally in favor of the project, but does that guarantee that it would actually materialize? Not really. Even if the diplomatic aspects associated with this issue have been sorted out, quite a few economic considerations will pop up that could lead to this initiative being shelved (e.g. the substantial proceeds generated by the Port of Ashdod, which serves as the home port of the Gaza Strip).

Turkey – a Prolonged Recovery

On Tuesday evening, at Ataturk Airport in Istanbul, builders were still hard at work mending the damage sustained here during the failed coup on the night between Friday and Saturday last week.

The repair work is being performed very quickly, so that within a few days there will be nothing left at the airport to reflect the recent events, but Turkey as a whole will be licking its wounds for a long time to come.

The most interesting aspect of the story is the Turkish military, elements of which were involved in the conspiracy.

Some facts to gain some proportions regarding the Turkish military: almost one million enlisted men and women and regulars make up its manpower. The Turkish Air Force is the second largest within NATO after USAF, and the Turkish Navy is the largest in the Middle East. The ILS figure of the IDF budget is close to the US$ figure of the budget of the Turkish military (which means that the Turkish budget is four times as high as the Israeli one).

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already initiated a comprehensive purge within the top echelon of the Turkish military, but it seems that he will never be able to fully control this monstrous organization, bound by the Turkish constitution to maintain Turkey's secular character, mainly in view of the fact that a major percentage of the commanders and troopers of the Turkish military belong to population groups that are hostile to Erdoğan: secular groups, rival Islamist groups and the huge Kurdish minority.

Regardless of the military, two points associated with the attempted coup from an Israeli angle: one – Israel was very wise to avoid any official statement until the attempted coup turned out to be a failure. Two – the recent events will have no effect whatsoever on the reconciliation agreement signed between the two countries just recently.

The reconciliation process is going on as planned – the Turks have already sent ships carrying relief goods to Gaza through the Port of Ashdod (even before the attempted coup). As the next stage, the Turkish parliament would have to revoke all of the statutes enacted against Israeli military personnel in the context of the fighting in the Gaza Strip, at which time Israel would pay Turkey US$ 20 million as compensations for the Marmara flotilla incident. Only then will the ambassadors of the two countries return to the embassies in Ankara and Tel-Aviv.